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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
RELIGION, POLITICS AND WAR IN THE CREATION OF AN ETHOS OF CONFLICT IN 
COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF THE WAR OF THE THOUSAND DAYS (1899-1902) 
by 
Margarita Díaz Cáceres 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ana Maria Bidegain, Major Professor 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the way in which religion and politics played a 
role in the formulation of a cyclical ethos of conflict, focusing in the last and most important 
civil war of nineteenth-century Colombia: The War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902). A 
historiographical review was used to understand the interactions between these two 
structures, and it pointed at a main problem centered in the political use of religion, as well 
as the transformation of political debate into a matter of political faith. In conclusion, the 
War of the Thousand days strengthened narratives of vengeance, worsened the situation 
of the country, and solidified an ethos of conflict in which the State used the Church to 
legitimize itself against the threats to the status quo of systemic inequality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Thousand Days’ War is considered the most bloody and destructive conflict that 
afflicted nineteenth-century Colombia. Spanning between 1899 and 1902, this war fought 
between Liberal and Conservative forces marked the end of an era of political strife and 
federalist initiatives. By the end of it, eighty thousand people had died of diseases or in 
combat, a staggering number given that the Colombian population was around four 
million people. This decrease in population produced a sharp decrease in agricultural 
production, which in turn brought an economic and political crisis that caused the 
separation of Panama and the fall of the regime that had won the war (Martínez Carreño 
1999, 211). 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relation among politics, war and 
religion in the context of this war, and how the connection among these elements 
created a cyclical model of conflict. The main thesis of this research claims that the War 
of the Thousand Days’ reinforced a model of extreme political dualism that worked 
through belief instead of scrutiny, creating a cycle of armed conflict that could be 
manipulated by the elites of the two opposing factions. This led to the creation of a model 
of exclusivist identity based on partisan relations, that uses the methods of religion to 
understand politics.  
 As historian Germán Colmenares stated, there are a series of “historiographical 
cages” regarding the treatment of Colombian history (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 514). These 
cages are assumptions created by taking historical sources at face value: these ideas lay 
uncontested for years, working as the basic analytical structure for research. Two of 
these conventions will be confronted in this work: being Catholic could be equated to be 
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a member of the Conservative Party, the Catholic Church was an unified institution that 
used the State to accomplish its goals.    
 These ideas will be challenged in four chapters: the first is an overview of the 
relation between the Colombian State and religion in the nineteenth century, the second 
is an analysis of the Regeneration and its policies as the main causes of the Thousand 
Days’ War, the third is an overview of the war itself, focusing on its fragmentation, and 
the last will be about how the issues of religion, identity and politics fueled the conflict 
and built a framework for future problems.  
The sources of information for these chapters are mostly secondary sources, 
except for the third chapter, that will be based in both historiography and testimonies of 
those who participated in the war. Both sources will lead to a deeper understanding of 
the multiple actors in the War, as well as the motivations behind their actions.  
These texts will be analyzed and compared with one another to find divergences, 
blind spots and common themes among them in order to find the common themes that 
constitute the basis of the ethos of conflict. After all, the Thousand Days’ War must be 
seen not as an isolated incident, but part of a greater historical and social pattern of 
cyclical conflict in Colombia. 
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II. RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN COLOMBIA 1810-1880 
Map of Colombia, 1886. Taken from the "Atlas geográfico e histórico de la República de 
Colombia, 1890” by the Geographical Institute Agustín Codazzi. 
 
Colombia is a country located in the northwestern part of South America, and as the map 
shows, it is divided by three mountain ranges that belong to the greater Andean 
mountain range (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social 2016, 16-17). Most of the 
population lives in these mountain ranges, with the larger cities such as Bogotá or 
Medellin located in the highland valleys and plateaus, while other important cities, such 
as Cartagena or Santa Marta, are in the Caribbean coast. Other regions, such as the 
pacific coast, the Amazonian rainforest or the eastern plains were sparsely populated 
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during the nineteenth century, and therefore held little importance to the political power 
of Bogotá. 
Geographical division has a great influence in Colombian culture and politics; the 
unity of the nation, though possible through common political and economic practices, 
must be understood in terms of a union of regions. Of all the former colonies of Spain in 
America, Colombia is one of the most isolated from communication from the outside 
world, given how far the seat of power is from the closest seaport: the modern road 
between Bogotá and Cartagena spans for 643 miles of difficult and diverse geography 
that was even harder to traverse before the advent of modern transportation 
technologies. 
These conditions did not foster economic development, and during the nineteenth 
century, the economy of Colombia was based on a model of scarcity, lack of industry 
and the exportation of unrefined products such as coffee, tobacco, cotton, gold, and 
cocoa. This economic model, based mostly in commodities, consisted in a series of 
cycles between booms and crisis of exportation, making Colombia a country dependent 
on the forces of international markets, but never fully integrated to them (Bergquist 1973, 
1-3). Such economic fragility was mixed with an education system that fostered a 
classical education in rhetoric and grammar, and produced a situation in which the young 
men of the elites had to compete for the jobs at the government either in the elections or 
in the several civil wars of the nineteenth century (Quijano and Esguerra 1919, 525-24). 
In this scene of geographical division and economic fragility, the Colombian 
government tried to maintain control of the population through taxes and laws. However, 
this purpose was thwarted by other factors: communications were slow thanks to the 
geography, and the lack of literate population made administrative tasks much harder. 
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During the nineteenth century, most of the population was illiterate; according to the 
education law passed in November 14, 1898 only 16% of the total population knew how 
to read and write (González Rey 2015, 256). It is plausible to think that literacy regarding 
Latin, the official language of the Church, was even lower. 
It was in this context that the power of the Catholic Church can be properly 
understood. The Church had a great amount of literate personnel, with a social network 
that crossed the entire country and had continuous contact with people in Europe and 
the rest of the Americas. The fact that this institution also predated the independent 
Colombian republic made for a context in which it held an immense amount of power 
over the nation (Fontecha 2009, 14-16). Albeit immense, this power was not completely 
uncontested, and it waned progressively from 1810 to 1886, when a new political 
Constitution gave away the control of the education, healthcare, the registration of the 
population and other social services to the Church, as it had been in colonial times (Abel 
1984, 14-15).  
Beyond any change in time and any specific role, the Church also had a great 
part to play in the discussion about of one of the most important aspects of national 
identity: religion. Just like any other social institution, the Church it was not monolithic, 
and harbored many different perspectives over different issues, including the most 
contentious one: which should be its place in society (González 2006, 35). This problem 
was the cause of many difficulties between the Church, the State and the political parties 
that dominated Colombia through all the nineteenth century. 
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Church and State under the ‘Patronato’ (1810-1860) 
The Spanish conquest of what is today the territory of Colombia was not an easy 
enterprise; even before their arrival, the geographical difficulties played a part in the 
social fragmentation of the territory. Unlike Peru or Mexico, Colombia was not part of a 
great pre-Columbian empire: instead, the groups that lived in it relied on trade routes that 
crossed the Andes (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1989, 27-28). The complex geography made for a 
slow conquest of the territory, one that was not even complete by the period of 
independence: by the end of the nineteenth century, territories like the Amazonian 
rainforest, the Pacific coast and the eastern plains were still outside of the influence of 
the State. 
 The conquerors brought with them two institutions; the State, represented by the 
Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church. These two seats of power were related through 
the figure of the ‘Patronato’, a patronage in which the Church gave the Crown a tribute 
from the tithes it collected, giving the Spanish monarch the right to ask for an oath of 
fidelity from the clergy, and allowing the Crown to control the communication between 
the Holy See and the Church personnel in the American colonies (Tirado Mejía 1989, 
167).  This institution was not meant to be an egalitarian treaty: The Crown had power 
over the Church, and not the other way around, as it could be seen during the time of the 
Bourbon Reforms, a series of policies enacted in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, with the purpose of taking the power from the creole elites and give it back to 
the Spaniards. Sectors of the clergy protested these reforms, and in some cases 
supported those who rebelled against them, an act that was considered treason by the 
laws of the time (Bidegain 2013, 203-206). 
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The tensions caused by these reforms, along with the power void left by the 
Napoleonic invasion of Spain, caused a movement that resulted in the independence in 
1810, a period of political upheaval in which many priests, who did not belong to a 
religious order, supported the claim for liberation from Spain (W. Plata 2010, 66-67). As 
an important part of the intellectual class of the New Granada, the priesthood wrote 
about the situation; Spanish priests wrote about the authority f the king, while the criollos 
wrote in favor of the independence movement. (Tirado Mejía 1989, 168). As Ferdinand 
VII started the process of reconquest of the former colonies, the republican priests also 
suffered: under the rule of General Pablo Morillo and his Vicar, Louis de Villabrille, 
priests were incarcerated and their property passed to the conquerors (Bidegain 2013, 
227-229). 
Though the Independence from Spain, ratified by the military campaigns of Simón 
Bolívar, made the territory of what is now Colombia free from the Spanish Empire, it also 
severed the relations between the Church in Europe and the Church in Colombia (Plata 
2014, 67). The Spanish priests had to leave the country, making the education of new 
clergy even more difficult, besides this, religious orders such as the Franciscans and the 
Dominicans saw a steep decline in prestige thanks to the image of the secular clergy as 
more compromised with Republican ideas. Smaller convents were closed in 1821 with 
the support of the secular clergy (Plata 2014, 88-90).  
 Religious institutions did not remain unscathed after independence: power was 
divided between the Church, the Independence Army and the nascent Republican State. 
Being in a deep economic disadvantage, the State had to find new ways to finance itself 
and balance the accumulated wartime deficit. However, it was difficult to expropriate the 
Church or to start taking away its power, mostly because it had everything the State 
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lacked: literate personnel, a firm position in the national territory, and popularity among 
the population (Ortiz Mesa 2013, 11-12).   
This renewed and strained relationship pointed out some of the general aspects 
of nineteenth century Colombia: the general weakness of the State regarding public 
order and sources of revenue practically made the Church a pillar of social order 
(Bergquist 1973, 23). It also gave way for a continuation of the merging of religious and 
political affairs: between 1821 and 1835, the State had power to modify the tithes, 
appoint Bishops, create new dioceses, and give limits to those that already existed. It 
also allowed local functionaries to appoint parish priests. This situation caused the 
proclamation of a new, Republican ‘Patronato’ in 1834, before the Vatican recognized 
Colombia as an independent nation in 1836. As the State took privileges over the 
Church, an antagonistic relation stemmed from the tension between those who wanted a 
free Church and those who considered it to be a hindrance on the development of the 
new nation (Ortiz Mesa 2013, 12-13). 
 The development of this antagonism can be seen in the social criticism of the 
Church after independence; after a period of religious fervor, the religiosity of the 
population seemed to falter. According to the clergy, this was the fault of the ‘impious 
writers’ that took people away from religion with their new philosophies and stories 
(Cortés Guerrero 2016, 79-80). However, the main problem was the lack of personnel 
and the abandonment of clerical discipline after the Spanish Bishops left the country; 
Colombia did not have proper seminaries until 1840, and there were no clear regulations 
for priests in the territory. Some left their posts, some resorted to gambling or alcohol, 
and most of them were not able to educate the people at their charge (Vega Rincón 
2011, 103-105).  
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In spite of these problems, there was a clear domain of the Church regarding the 
education of the citizens, a matter that caused tensions between the religions institution 
and the State. Short after the Independence Campaign of 1819 President Francisco de 
Paula Santander proclaimed an education policy based on the pedagogical theories of 
Johann Pestalozzi, taking away some of the privileges that the Church had over 
education (Jaramillo Uribe 1989, 224). Though it was a measure that didn’t last long, it 
opened the debate over the educational policy; for the Church any kind of education that 
didn’t answer to Catholic dogma was a way to give the country away to nefarious 
influences (Díaz Díaz 1989, 205). 
This fear of the foreign marked many of the political expressions and conflicts of 
the nineteenth century, along with a Eurocentric perspective, in which any of the political 
changes of the country was seen through European categories (González 2006, 41-42). 
The French Revolution and all its symbolism was one of the most reviled points of 
comparison of the Church, and since political identity was one of the most contentious 
points of this period, these categories were appropriated in political discourse. In the 
case of this example, practically any policy or group that contradicted the Church was 
seen as part of the same conspiracy that deposed the monarchy in France (Bergquist 
1973, 267). 
The appropriation of political discourse was just a piece of all the blurry 
framework that articulated political and religious conflict. This structure can be seen in 
the case of the War of the Supremes (1839-1841), in which the closing of the convents 
and monasteries with less than eight members in the city of Pasto sparked the first civil 
war of the century (González, 2006, 37-38). After all the problems between the State and 
the Church, the closing of religious institutions was seen as the last offense to religion 
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itself; those who allied themselves with the convents called their associates, who called 
their clientele, while the opposing side did the same, developing a network of alliances 
and actors, some with agendas that had nothing to do with the Church, like José María 
Obando, that changed the conflict from a local dispute to a national civil war (Tirado 
Mejía 1989, 172). 
Escalation of conflict in the War of the Supremes, as well as the wars of 1851 and 
1854 was caused by the structure of the two main political factions in Colombia: The 
Liberal party, founded in 1848 and the Conservative party, funded in 1849 (Tirado Mejía 
1989, 159). These parties were structures based on clienteles, with an elite 
compromised of rich members of society, a middle class of regional landlords and a base 
of mostly illiterate citizens (Fontecha 2009, 10-11). The main differences between the 
Liberal and Conservative party were about issues of individual liberties and the place of 
the Church in society. Conservatives wanted to uphold authority, centralism and a state 
where the Church took care of issues of education and social welfare, while the Liberals 
wanted to uphold individual liberties, federalism and a Secular State.  
Conservatives were seen as traditional landlords, while Liberals sold themselves 
as businessmen, though reality was far more complex than that, as the case of Liberal 
landlord Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera would show in the second part of the nineteenth 
century (Tirado Mejía 1989, 161). As the Conservatives had the Church as their 
institutional allies, the Liberals had the freemasonic lodges of Colombia; the image of the 
Liberal freemason transcended the boundaries of everyday realities and became an 
established trope of Colombian historical narrative of the nineteenth century (Abel 1984, 
18). 
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Like any other institutions, these parties had inner divisions, mostly regarding the 
role of the main leaders: personal leadership created tensions within the party, and yet it 
didn’t break them apart entirely. This unity has more to do with the mutual animosity of 
Liberals and Conservatives than with the ideas of the party, since both groups were 
mutually exclusive and became more radical with every action undertaken by the 
opponent. Perhaps the only moments in which both parties could reach compromise was 
when the political establishment was so weak that it could be overridden by people from 
lower social classes, a phenomenon that was tackled after 1854 (González 2006, 44-45).  
By the decade of 1850, the division between the two parties shifted from a 
discussion between two elite groups to full mutual exclusion from politics. As the 
Conservatives allied themselves with the Church and its plights, the Liberals took more 
measures against the ecclesiastic hierarchy, mostly because they considered that the 
involvement of clergy in politics was more about supporting the Conservative party than 
about fulfilling their spiritual role (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 107-108). It is necessary to 
point that the Conservatives allied themselves with the Church, not the other way 
around: there were Liberal priests within the Dominican Order from 1820 to 1850 (Plata 
2014, 78) and at least a couple of members of the clergy who were also part of 
Freemason lodges, a orgnization known by its ties to the Liberal party (Cortés Guerrero 
2016, 184).  
The reforms of the middle of the century represented a great shift in the relations 
between the State and the Church in Colombia, mostly because it brought a separation 
and a reform of their financial ties. These reforms made possible for priests to be elected 
in their parishes just as mayors were, took away the tithes that the State gave the 
Church, and proclaimed academic, religious and press freedom. The Liberal State saw in 
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these reforms the dismantlement of the privileges of the Church, while the Conservatives 
and the Church itself saw this as a grave offense to its rights and the rights of Colombian 
Catholics (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 154).  
The reasoning behind the perspectives of both institutions was based in one 
single difference; while the State saw the Church as an earthly institution, the Church 
saw itself as the bulwark of an absolute, sacred truth. To touch the tithes was to violate 
the commandment of loving God, because it meant that the government didn’t care 
about maintaining His institution; to make the position of parish priest a matter of election 
was an intrusion of the government in the discipline of the Church; and to take away the 
Church control of education and religion was an invitation for immorality (Cortés 
Guerrero 2016, 161-174). The State wanted to become a stronger institution, and to do 
this, it became an intruder on matters that only competed to the religious institution, 
creating a tension that could hardly be resolved with this kind of intrusive politics. 
Catholicism was seen as the one and true religion of the Colombian people, and 
therefore all these tensions affected most of the population, according to the Church. 
Liberalism claimed that tithes and limitations restricted both the economic and the 
intellectual development of the same population (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 156). Beyond 
any of these claims, both factions represented the people of Colombia as victims that 
needed their salvific policies, a claim hard to contradict thanks to the rampant illiteracy of 
the time.  
An example of how partisan factions played out in the political context of this time 
is the debate about the presence of foreign clergy in Colombia, with the case of the 
Jesuits being the most contentious one. Liberals considered that members of this order 
were part of a foreign interference, and some sectors of the Church mistrusted them 
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because they did not answer to Colombian Bishops (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 176-79,186-
89). Jesuits were exiled in 1851 by the Liberal government with documents signed by the 
King of Spain in 1767: the paradox of those who were against the legacy of colonial 
times using colonial documents had not been lost to time.  
The case of the Jesuits also gives an example of the practice of exile as a 
punishment for those whom the State considered its enemies, but it was not the most 
controversial, or the one with more political repercussion. That case was the exile of 
Manuel José Mosquera (1800-1853), the Archbishop of Bogotá, who had broken the law 
written in the article 269 of the penal code of 1837, that prohibited public servants to 
obstruct the actions of the State. The Archbishop was against the part of the law that 
gave the government authority over the election of parish priests, and protested against 
it, disobeying its instructions. His trial began in May 24 1853, and he was sentenced to 
exile, dying in France in the same year (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 201-211). 
The exile and subsequent death of Archbishop Mosquera in exile was taken as 
an act of persecution; he was one of the many martyrs of what the Church considered an 
international persecution. In Colombia, Catholicism was part of the sacralization of 
political power through the combination of religious and political rituals (i.e. consecration 
of the presidency), and so the steps that the State took to take control of the 
ecclesiastical institution under Liberal principles was considered an attempt to destroy 
religion (Tirado Mejía 1989, 115-117). However, the Liberal reforms of the mid-century 
were halted, not by the Church, but by the coup of General Jose María Melo in 1854, 
which was preceded by a short civil uprising supported by the emerging working class of 
Bogotá (Tirado Mejía 1989, 173).  
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This coup points at a contentious problem in the historiography of Colombia: the 
fixation on written sources causes history to be written exclusively about the elites, and 
the majority of the population comes to light only in cases such as this upheaval. It was 
in this War of 1854 that fear of popular movements developed more clearly among the 
political elite of both Liberal and Conservative parties. In order to control the masses, 
and in light of the uprising and the influence of the clergy in politics, the debate about the 
nature of the political subject in Colombia started to focus in electoral matters, mostly 
regarding who could and who could not participate in politics through elections. While in 
the beginning, the Liberals had the opinion that universal suffrage was necessary for the 
development of the nation, they discovered in 1858 that their ideas were against their 
political interests. Besides this, Liberalism was split in two different factions; the 
“Gólgotas”, high-class urban businessmen who defended a model of free market, and 
“Draconianos”, low-class artisans who wanted a protectionist economic policy (Tirado 
Mejía 1989, 173). The change of electoral rules had the objective to exclude all 
opponents, including those within the same political party, and those who could benefit 
from social change. 
Melo was forced to resign by a coalition of both Conservative and Liberal 
generals, that kept intact the new legislation that abolished gun control, and yet they 
reduced the army to its most minimal expression, in order to arm themselves whenever 
they deemed necessary and to not allow popular movements to acquire power through 
the military (Tirado Mejía 1989, 173). After the victory of Conservative candidate Mariano 
Ospina Rodríguez, the Liberals blamed the clergy and decided to implement voting 
restrictions based mostly on classist standards of property and literacy, which they did 
when they returned to power after the war of 1859-1862 (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 243-
244). However, after the crisis caused by Melo, both parties decided to keep the 
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electoral mechanism intact, averting military coups and social crisis without the loss of 
the clientelist political structure.  
After the conservative electoral victory of 1858, president Ospina declared a new 
constitution that respected the federal organization proclaimed in 1853. This constitution 
was one of the six documents sanctioned by the Colombian State in the nineteenth 
century (1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863 and 1886) (Tirado Mejía 1989, 155) .These 
changes of legal framework were generally preceded by political upheaval or civil war, 
making the constitution part of the spoils of the victors, who usually used it to exclude the 
enemy faction, inciting the indignation necessary to spark another conflict this was the 
case of the war of 1859-1862. 
This conflict was caused by the perceived interference of the central, 
Conservative government and the administrations of the States under its rule: Bolívar, 
Cauca, Magdalena and Santander were the first to rebel against the directives from 
Bogotá. The leadership and troops of Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, brother of the exiled 
Archbishop, proved crucial in this conflict. As a powerful landlord, member of one of the 
richest families of the Republic, and leader of one of the main freemasonic lodges of 
Colombia, Mosquera advanced in the ranks of the Liberal party, conquered the capital in 
July 1861, and started to establish laws that modified the relation between the State and 
the Church in the same way that the 1851 reforms did (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 293-294). 
 
Liberalism and Catholic discourse (1860-1880) 
The period between the first reforms of Mosquera and the political pact known as the 
Regeneration was dominated by the political ideas of radical Liberalism, which included 
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a proclamation of a new constitution in 1863. The United States of Colombia was a State 
of radical federalism, with freedoms of press, academia, weapon property and religion; 
the old Patronato was replaced by a more comprehensive and radical reform, in which, 
the radical Liberals implemented a series of policies that put the Church under the 
authority of the State, took away most of its property and cut down all financial support to 
the institution (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 298-299). Once more, the irony of the Liberal, 
supposedly more modern, state using colonial forms of power to ensure its power has 
not been lost to time.  
To understand these measures is necessary to analyze the laws of cult 
inspection and tuition, as well as the decree of confiscation of Church property. Cult 
tuition was the policy that made mandatory for all priest to have the permission of the 
government to fulfill their religious functions; it also made possible for the State to control 
all the Ecclesiastic documents that circulated in the country and to exile all foreign 
religious personnel (Tirado Mejía 1989, 170). Though this measure was applied to all 
religious institutions no matter their origin, the Catholic Church, being almost the sole 
institution of the country was the only one who became the target of these measures.  
But the policy of cult inspection and tuition was not the most controversial matter 
of these times; that dubious honor belonged to the Confiscation decree of September 9, 
1861. Known in Spanish as the “Decreto de desamortización de bienes de manos 
muertas”1, this decree confiscated the real state the Church had gained through the 
contributions made in the wills of dead devotees, putting them in the market and selling 
them. The only properties that were not allowed to be confiscated were the temples 
themselves, the houses of religious communities, jails, markets and all property that had 
                                                          
1 “Decree of desamortization of dead hands’ property” 
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any other public use (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 306-307). This decree was written and 
supported by then Secretary of Treasure Rafael Núñez, who was excommunicated, and 
later in the nineteenth century promoted measures completely against these kind of laws 
(Jaramillo and Meisel 2008, 11). 
Along with this decree, the government of Mosquera exiled Archbishop Antonio 
Herrán, threatened with exile all priests who protested the law, and closed all the 
religious orders of both sexes. This degree of coercion was new, but the idea of taking 
away Church property was not something new; it had been part of the reforms of the 
Crown in the eighteenth century, as well as policies from 1826 and 1845 (Rico Bonilla 
2010, 50-51). This process was also part of the story of the modern States: Paraguay, 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and México had done it before Colombia as a way to 
undermine their colonial legacy and renew their internal markets (Jaramillo and Meisel 
2008, 5).  
These initiatives of government control were meant to reduce the political power 
of the clergy allied with the conservative party, to foster a more modern State in 
Colombia and to activate the real estate market. The profits earned through the 
confiscation decree were also meant to alleviate the deficit of the State, both in 
international and national debt (Díaz Díaz 1989, 210). Besides the controversy that this 
process caused, there were also many logistical problems regarding the quantification of 
the riches of the Church; given the problems of communication, corruption and lack of 
literate personnel, it was hard to carry on the processes of appraisal and auction of the 
new properties, this caused the process to dwindle in 1867 and to stop altogether by 
1871 (Rico Bonilla 2010, 57,60). By this time, 15.362.429 pesos had been earned, 
mostly in the regions of Cundinamarca and Cauca (Jaramillo and Meisel 2008, 16). 
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This great amount of money did not compensate for the political and economic 
hassle that the Colombian government had undertaken. The Church was not as rich as it 
was estimated, and the general poverty of the citizens mixed with both the corruption of 
the political system and the desperation of the State to create a situation in which it was 
impossible to negotiate good prices for the confiscated properties. These economic 
measures also worsened the problem of economic inequality, as the land was 
concentrated in a few rich proprietors; although the GDP grew by 16%, it was not 
enough to pay the massive debt of the country (Rico Bonilla 2010, 55-56). 
If the whole Church as an apparatus that hindered the economic development of 
the country, then religious orders were seen as sources of idleness, and those who 
resisted the measure against them were exiled, either to foreign lands or to the so-called 
‘wild’ territory of the Eastern Plains, as was the case with the friars of the Dominic order 
(Cortés Guerrero 2016, 310, 313). Exile, was favored as a punishment before any other 
sentence for Church members because they were not considered citizens, for they 
swore allegiance to another set of laws that came from a foreign nation: the disciplinarian 
codes that came from the Holy See (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 328). These massive exiles 
also helped the State to protect its own borders by deploying priests near them; besides, 
the work of these men was to convert the indigenous population, integrating them into 
the nation through the erasure of their identities.  
The reaction of both the Church and the Conservative party to these actions was 
of rejection. However, in this case there were two characteristics that made the State-
Church relation more strained than before. one was the fact that there were Liberal 
priests like Juan Nepomuceno Azuero and Pascual Afanador who followed the decree 
even if they felt abandoned by their own party, showing a tendency of the Church to 
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become more radical as an answer to the policies of Mosquera (Tirado Mejía 1989, 170). 
The second one would develop after the proclamation of both the Constitution of 1863 
and the Syllabus of errors of 1864: the influence of the situation of the Church in Europe 
in the discourse of the Colombian clergy. 
The Constitution of 1863, written by the Liberals in the town of Rionegro, 
Antioquia, was a radical departure from the Constitution sanctioned in 1858. Though it 
also followed the federal model, it put the Church under the authority of the State and 
granted the States the rights to make their own laws, print their own money, have their 
own tax models and their own army. Written in its entirety by Liberal politicians, this 
constitution was the product of a rift between two factions of the same party: those who 
were against Mosquera and those who supported him (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 317-318, 
322).  
Feeling that the general wished to perpetuate his power, the radicals who wrote 
the constitution weakened the central government by reducing the presidential term to 
two years, declaring its absolute neutrality in the rebellions of the states, and reducing its 
military power to the National Guard, a force that had little else than symbolic purposes. 
Political power shifted from the clienteles of Bogotá, to the clienteles of the sovereign 
states, breaking down the structures of power under a philosophy of laissez faire, laissez 
passer (Tirado Mejía 1989, 174-175).  
Under this form of government, the States became more and more powerful; in 
the case of Antioquia and Tolima, their power not only worked in a local level, but also in 
a national one, as both sovereign states had a flourishing economic situation, a strong 
army, and a conservative majority in power (Tirado Mejía 1989, 174). The association 
between the Conservative party and the Church solidified thanks to the actions of radical 
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Liberals in Colombia: both considered that the confiscation of goods was theft, and the 
sentences given to the clergy that resisted the measures of the government were part of 
a persecution against Catholicism. The Liberal considered that this alliance proved that 
the Church was not focusing on its spiritual work, but on the consecution of political 
power, a “theocratic rule” that had to be extinguished with more radical measures 
(Cortés Guerrero 2016, 346-347). 
By September 1863, Pope Pius IX had written to the Bishops and Archbishops of 
Colombia, condemning the government and its laws with ‘apostolic authority’. Mosquera 
answer to the Pope was a ‘reminder’ that he was not the owner of Colombia, and 
therefore had no authority to interfere in the inner workings of the nation. Mosquera was 
excommunicated, and the Church experienced a rift between those who decided to 
follow the decrees of the government and those who protested against them (Díaz Díaz 
1989, 213) . From then on, the situation became worse, as Pope Pius IX proclaimed the 
Syllabus of Errors, a document that explicitly condemned Liberalism and all the policies 
that went against the wishes of the Church. 
The Syllabus was an addendum to the Quanta Cura encyclical, published in 
December 8 1864 as an answer to the crisis of the Church in Mexico, Poland, and 
France (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 401). This document was focused on the condemnation 
of what the Church considered errors of the time, all of them based on the idea that 
Scripture was not the source of absolute truth, and therefore the Church was not perfect 
nor it had any authority over political matters. Of the 79 errors listed in this document, 
those numbered from 77 to 79 refer explicitly to the errors of Liberalism, including 
freedom of religion and the idea of the Pope reconciling with the ideas deemed as 
mistakes in the document. Not only did the Syllabus condemn a whole political worldview 
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in name of religion: it also banned any kind of dialogue or reconciliation between 
Liberalism and the Church. 
 In Colombia, the Syllabus only worsened the already strained situation: Liberals 
considered it was the leading document of the Conservative party (Cortés Guerrero 
2016, 405), and for the Conservatives it was a call for action, as well as a source of 
arguments against the actions of the government. In 1867 Colombian priests met in a 
synod with the objective of decide what to do with the situation of the Church, that seems 
to get worse thanks to the advances of Liberalism. When the synod finally met in 
December 1870, the government had already implemented policies related to the clerical 
monopoly of education, and the clergy met to tackle them. 
 In the session of the national congress of September 22, 1867, the federal 
government approved the act of the creation of a National University. Though the Liberal 
government had abolished all Universities in the name of destroying the monopoly over 
knowledge, it still needed a center to educate the necessary personnel. This endeavor 
was part of a larger educational program focused on technical knowledge for the sake of 
industrialization: in the beginning, the university taught courses in law, medicine, 
philosophy, natural sciences, engineering and arts. Though it was completely 
disconnected from any branch of the ecclesiastic hierarchy, the University had members 
of the Conservative party among its instructors, such as Miguel Antonio Caro and 
Manuel María Madiedo, who worked along prominent Liberals like Manuel Ancízar and 
Ezequiel Rojas. In theory, it would be a non-politicized institution dedicated to the 
propagation of knowledge (Jaramillo Uribe 1989, 239-241). 
 The same kind of justification was behind the Organic Decree of Public 
Instruction; signed the first day of November 1870, this decree made primary education 
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mandatory and secular, making religious education an option for the parents, but not a 
duty of the State (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 475). Though the decree was written as a 
neutral law regarding religion, the Church took it as a measure to erase Catholicism from 
the country, starting with the children. The fact that German protestant teachers were 
brought help bolster this perception, even when states like Antioquia compromised with 
the government by accepting German teachers but only if they were Catholic. 
Both the clergy and the members of the Conservative party considered that a 
government that proclaimed a law that criminalized those who didn’t want to take their 
children to a secular school, went against the liberty of parents to educate their offspring. 
This mandatory policy was seen as a confirmation of the intention of the government to 
erase Catholicism, and was quoted by the Bishops of Pasto, Popayán, Medellín and 
Antioquia as the reason why they would excommunicate parents that sent their children 
to government schools (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 484).  
It was this problem of mandatory education that also sparked controversy in the 
National University, but this time about the mandatory texts written by Destut de Tracy 
and Jeremy Bentham. Rejected by the Church, the philosophies of this authors were part 
of the mandatory curriculum of the departments of Law and Philosophy (Jaramillo Uribe 
1989, 242). Though Liberals considered themselves to be open in all matters of public 
life, the obligatory nature of these texts made all their claims feel fake amidst the 
denounces of their Conservative peers. 
As most lawyers became politicians in this point in time, these texts were seen as 
another part of the Liberal conspiracy to destroy the Church and proclaim an atheist 
tyranny. Liberals, on the other hand, saw the rejection of secular values as proof that the 
Church and the Conservative party wanted to install a theocratic regime with the values 
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of colonial time. Both factions became irreconcilable, thanks to both the pressure of the 
Syllabus and the mandatory nature of government policies: by 1876, high tensions, lack 
of dialogue, and a looming economic crisis helped spark another civil war (Cortés 
Guerrero 2016, 452-454).  
Known as the “War of the Schools”, the civil war of 1876-1877 was made in name 
of religion, but motivated by both economic and political reasons. Tolima and Antioquia 
were two largely Conservative States that rebelled against when they perceived as the 
tyranny of the central government; Cauca has an oligarchy in economic decadence 
(Tirado Mejía 1989, 174); Magdalena and Bolívar, the states from the Caribbean coast, 
had an economic crisis thanks to a crisis related to their customs revenue (Cortés 
Guerrero 2016, 487). These five States had their own armies, and rebelled against the 
government: they suffered military defeats, and had problems among themselves due to 
regional differences.  
Since war threatened to destroy their sources of revenue, the rebels preferred a 
negotiated solution with the Liberal government. This gave the image of a victorious 
Liberal party, whose members in the National University claimed that war was an 
unfortunate but necessary event destined to stop the enemies of reason and progress 
(Cortés Guerrero 2016, 493-494). This positivist outlook of history was part of all Liberal 
governments around Latin America, unfortunately, it was not upheld in Colombia thanks 
to the lack of economic development. 
With all ways of dialogue between the different factions already broken, the 
political establishment of radical Liberalism started to crumble, even when it seemed to 
have earned victory against its enemies. The priests who supported the rebellion of 1876 
were exiled for ten years, confirming the political persecution of Church members, and 
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the party had begun to experience divisions between its most radical sector and the 
moderate factions. This faction, along with young upstarts, rejected Liberals, and the 
military and all those who did not support the growing political polarization helped a 
politician from Cartagena, Rafael Núñez, to win the elections in 1880 (González 2006, 
56-57), marking the beginning of the end to the power of radical Liberalism in Colombia. 
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III. COLOMBIA DURING THE ‘REGENERATION’ 1880-1899 
As seen before, the projects undertaken by the Radical Liberals after 1863 were part of a 
whole strategy to make the country progress and the economy grow away from its fragile 
cycles of exportations and importations. Efforts such as the education reforms, the 
establishment of the National University and the creation of the Geographical 
Commission of Agustín Codazzi (Poveda Ramos 1989, 160) expanded the knowledge of 
the elite of the time, but couldn’t break the cycles, which consisted in the exportation 
booms of quinine, tobacco, añil (Indigofera suffruticosa), gold and coffee.  
Though more diverse, the economy was as fragile as ever. The diversification of 
products, based in the free-trade policies of radical Liberalism, didn’t help to the 
monetary and fiscal chaos of the time: the was no national bank, and all the local banks 
had the right to print their own currency. This chaos made tax collection a burden, and 
therefore put the finances of the central government into a state of permanent disarray 
(Tirado Mejía 1989, 176). Looking for a total freedom of any kind of government intrusion 
in finances, the Liberal government of the time took away all the framework of the 
economy and was not able to capitalize on the possible opportunities for economic 
growth; unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia was not part of a larger 
international market. 
 Besides this lack of economic organization, the constitution of 1863 had not aged 
well by 1880: developments in the Colonies of England and the Netherlands had closed 
the market for Colombian quinine and añil (Bergquist 1973, 14). The lack of industry 
regulations enforces by the government also fostered the development of dishonest 
business practices, such as hiding plantain leaves in tobacco shipments. The loss of 
confidence in the nascent Colombian industry, the industrialization of western Europe 
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and the ties made through free trade flooded Colombia with imported goods, inhibiting 
the creations of any industry that didn’t focus on agricultural commodities like coffee 
(Bergquist 1973, 22).  
Amid a deeply unfavorable situation for the nascent national industry; young 
entrepreneurs also found difficulties in the already formed Liberal elite of Bogotá, and 
how their exclusive electoral policies denied them the access to the political world. With 
the looming threat of economic collapse on the horizon, the political situation was tense 
enough for President Rafael Núñez to reform the Colombian political apparatus through 
a series of changes: The Regeneration (“La Regeneración”) (Tirado Mejía 1989, 174-
175)   
 
The ‘Regeneration’ and the Constitution of 1886 
What we call the Regeneration was a political pact between Liberal dissidents and 
conservatives, all united under the leadership of president Rafael Núñez (Abel 1984, 1). 
Though its greatest success would be the proclamation of the 1886 Constitution, its 
ideological and political foundations were laid down in the first presidential term of 
Núñez. The main concepts of the Regeneration were Hispanism, the concentration of 
power in Bogotá, government oversight of the economy, and Catholicism and its ethics 
as the backbone of both national identity and the new legal framework (Blanco Mejía 
2009, 167).This was a clear opposition to the Liberal perspective of the Colonial heritage 
as a burden of backwardness, and gave those who opposed the Liberal program 
intellectual elements to criticize it as an unrealistic plan to erase the culture of Colombian 
people. 
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However, the fact that the Regeneration had elements of Hispanism didn’t mean 
it rejected everything unrelated to the Hispanic heritage of Colombia. This political 
program was based in traditionalist ideas, per which the absolute moral truth could be 
found in tradition; yet it took elements from the positivist philosophy of Herbert Spencer 
and did not reject the technological advancement of industrialization. It was industrial 
modernization without social or political modernity (Saldarriaga 2011, 9-10). It was a 
political program that benefitted the landowners and restricted the participation of the 
parliamentary institutions in favor of presidential power, creating an authoritarian regime 
that relegated the nascent bourgeois class of Colombia in favor of the landholders, 
especially the coffee growers (Blanco Mejía 2009, 4). 
 In practice, the first element of the Regeneration was the complete centralization 
of the country: though this was not an objective won until the constitution of 1886. In 
1885 the State of Santander, mostly Liberal, rebelled against the central government, 
losing the war at La Humareda, a pyrrhic victory that marked the end of the Liberal 
constitution of 1863 (Tirado Mejía 1989, 174-175). This rebellion also gave both 
Conservatives and dissidents the chance to join in a new “National Party” under the 
leadership of Núñez and Miguel Antonio Caro. These two leaders came from different 
backgrounds: Núñez had been Secretary of the Treasure under President Mosquera, 
Consul in England and had a worldly perspective of politics; Caro was a Latinist whose 
income came mostly from the land his family owned, and who had never ventured 
outside Bogotá (Abel 1984, 49).  
It would seem unlikely for the creator of the decree of confiscation policies to ally 
with one of the most outspoken critics of Liberalism. however, both were against the 
fragmentation of the country brought by the Constitution of 1863 and the inability of the 
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Radical Liberals to create economic growth. To transform Colombia into a country of 
"Order and Progress" it needed national unity, something that could be secured with the 
alliance between a centralist State and the social power of the Catholic Church (Andrade 
Álvarez 2011, 161-162). This proposal got Núñez and Caro the support of a sector of the 
Church, but also the backing from excluded Liberal politicians, the military, and young 
businessmen (González 2006, 56-57). 
 The Constitution of 1886, written in the name of God (República de Colombia 
1886, 3) changed the political organization of Colombia in its entirety. Political power was 
centralized in the presidency, that now served for a period of six years; governors were 
chosen by the president; monetary and tax policies were unified, and the departmental 
armies disbanded to form a national army (González 2006, 62-63). The secular nature of 
the 1863 Constitution was abandoned in favor of the Catholicism, now considered a pillar 
of social order and the source of religion and moral for the great majority of the 
population (Bergquist 1973, 29).  
This Constitution was far more repressive than the one of 1863; the death penalty 
came back to penal codes, the government could interfere with the freedom of press in 
order to prevent its “abuses”, as well as install a state of “armed peace”. This new legal 
framework favored the State and those who could act through it, making public order 
more important than any kind of right: Colombian people had freedoms, as long as those 
freedoms met the ambiguous idea of public order and “Christian morality” of those in 
power (Calle Meza 2006, 116-118). This mixture of religion and politics in the code of law 
made cemented the alliance between factions within the State and factions within the 
Church. However, it was the electoral legislation the one that prohibited a change in 
political power. 
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By changing the electoral rules, the National Party made sure that only high and 
middle-class owners could have any power in the presidential elections; just the kind of 
men who had placed the Regeneration in power. The concept of citizenship, defined by 
articles six to eighteen, was limited to the men twenty-one years old or older, who had a 
licit source of revenue, did not go in arms against the government of Colombia, nor had 
problems of drunkenness or mental illness (República de Colombia 1886, 6-8).  
Though it was not explicit, these kind of law made possible an almost total 
exclusion of the Colombian population; neither women, indigenous people, people of 
African descent, or poor men were able to vote. Such basic act of democracy was a 
privilege of few, and one that did not change much, because local representatives were 
chosen by the President. Besides this, there was another measure: those who voted 
could not ask anything from those elected, a policy though to stop corruption that only 
worked to foster inefficiency (Calle Meza 2006, 130).  
Such degree of centralization was planned to create an “Authoritarian Republic” 
that could bring order to the chaos brought by Radical Liberalism. The historical narrative 
of the Regeneration placed it as a return to the natural order, broken by Liberalism: its 
measures were justified as a reaction to the exclusion and the excesses of the 1863-
1866 period (Bergquist 1973, 56). Within the framework of the Regeneration, law was an 
instrument of power meant to uphold order and proper conduct, which had been lost 
under the constitution of 1863. Under the 1886 constitution, society was more important 
than the individual, whose private and public life were mixed, and therefore could be 
regulated to prevent disturbances (Adarve Calle 2012, 151-152).  
The legislation of the Regeneration was, at first, forgiving with its former enemies, 
the radical Liberals: by 1888 they were granted amnesty from the exile they had been 
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sentenced to. However, the situation soon changed with decrees such as the decree No. 
151 of February 17, 1888 that created the category of crimes against society included 
publications that encouraged disobedience to the law, offended civil or ecclesiastical 
authorities, incited social uprisings, or questioned the monetary system.  
But it was the Law 61 of May 23, 1888, better known as the Law of Horses, that 
made possible for the opposing Liberals to declare they lived in a Presidential tyranny. 
Written by magistrates chosen by then President Caro, the law was made to prevent 
enemies from undermining social order, and to give the President extraordinary powers 
to do so. This, combined with the renewed legality of the death penalty, caused common 
dissidents to be killed while the most famous ones were exiled (Adarve Calle 2012, 155-
156). This law was supplemented by the decree 286 of March 27, 1889, that isolated the 
country by not allowing foreign press from entering the country, as it was seen as 
contrary to Colombian morality and culture (Blanco Mejía 2009, 2).  
 Núñez and the other leaders of the Regeneration knew that, in order to restore 
centralism in the country, a repressive legal apparatus and a national army were not 
enough. The institutions that took care of social order were severely weakened after 
decades under the laissez faire policies of Radical Liberalism; the Regeneration restored 
the place of the Church as the institution in charge of organizing education, social 
assistance, demographic records, and protection of territories close to the borders. This 
was both a measure of faith and practicality: The State was not in a good financial 
situation, and therefore could not create new institutions that could undertake the work 
pertaining those matters, and it needed an ideological support to carry on with its 
centralization programs.  
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 The constitution of 1886 declared in its article number 38, that Catholicism was 
the religion of Colombia, and therefore the Catholic Church, its personnel, properties and 
interests would be protected by the State itself (República de Colombia 1886, 12). This 
guaranteed that the State would not undertake another confiscation effort, nor would it 
try to uphold an educational system without the approval of the Church: article 41 stated 
that all education would be planned per Catholic principles, and would not be mandatory 
(República de Colombia 1886, 13). Just as with centralization, these reforms were 
thought to restore order after the chaos left by the 1863 constitution. 
 The changes in the constitution demanded a new legal framework for the relation 
between the State and the Church. Since the Colombian State had the right to establish 
treaties with the Church, a new document was created by Cardinal Mariano Rampolla 
del Tíndaro and Minister Joaquín Fernando Vélez in the name of Pope Leon XIII and 
President Rafael Núñez: The Concordat of 1887. 
 
The Concordat 
Before discussing the nature of the Concordat, it is necessary to state that the situation 
of the Church in Colombia was not unique, nor it was the closest hit to the Ecclesiastic 
institution in the late nineteenth century: the hardest hit was the dissolution of the Papal 
States after the capture of Rome by Italian forces in September 1870. For the whole 
nineteenth century, the Holy See had experienced the tension with political liberalism 
across Europe, and it needed to ratify its authority over the clergy all over the world, 
authority that, in the case of Colombia, was shattered by measures such as the cult 
tuition and the confiscation of property.  
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 As a solution, the Church, under Pius IX and then under Leon XII, devised a 
series of policies commonly known as “Romanization”: this included the consolidation of 
Papal authority and ineffability, the establishment of new relations with civil powers 
across the globe, and the development of new ways to support the laity that had been 
taken away from the Church (Bautista García 2005, 105-106). These ecclesiastical 
reforms were undertaken from 1846 to 1903, and included the First Vatican Council of 
1870, in which the concept of Papal ineffability was finally formulated after being used by 
Pius IX in his dogmatic declaration of the Immaculate Conception of Mary.   
 The Romanization policies attempted to homogenize the Church, and gave it 
more power over the lay population, bringing it together with new devotions, groups and 
programs. However, these measures, just like the reforms of the Colombian State during 
under the Regeneration period, needed a framework: The Concordat. Unlike the 
Patronato, the Concordat was more a treaty on equal foot than a concession of 
privileges from the Church to civil power. This document was based on the Romanist 
policies and on the principle of “Regime of Christendom”, in which the State and the 
Church use the resources of the other to fulfil its ends. For Colombia, this was a matter 
of mutual convenience between the Church and the National Party of Núñez and Caro 
(Cortés Guerrero 2016, 495).   
 The Concordat gave the Church back the rights and privileges that it had lost 
during the 1863-1886 period, giving it elements to not negotiate its dogma but giving the 
clergy elements to adapt to the situation of their territory (Saldarriaga 2011, 8). It also 
stated boundaries for the State that had the purpose of repairing the damage done by 
the Liberal policies, and avoid the repetition of what happened before the Regeneration. 
Catholicism was the official religion of Colombia, and even if there was no express 
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prohibition of other religions, the official nature recognition of the Church gave it power 
that could not be emulated by other religious institutions. 
 Per the Concordat, it was the duty of the State to protect the Church, to respect 
the Canon Law, respect its property, give a payment to compensate for the property lost 
in confiscations, and abolish all laws that had been written before and were not 
compatible with the Concordat. As the Church had these rights, it also had duties: to pay 
taxes for every property but temples and houses of religious personnel, to do a prayer for 
the Republic and the President after every mass2, and to assure the frontiers of the 
country by doing missionary work in the territories still populated by indigenous groups 
(The Amazon basin, the Eastern Plains and some parts of the Pacific Coast). The 
Church also had the right to appoint military chaplains in the National Army for the 
spiritual needs of the soldiers.  
 Within the limits of the Concordat were also duties that the State passed to the 
Church, and vice versa. The Church revised the contents of educational texts and 
classes, making sure they were not against Catholicism; it could dismiss the teachers 
guilty of such offenses. After the reforms made on 1892 the Church was also in charge 
of the registration of births, deaths and marriages, as well as the administration of 
cemeteries.  
 However, as much privileges as the State could give the Church, there was a 
factor that tilted the balance of power: according to the fifteenth article of the Concordat, 
the President has the right to veto candidates for Bishop or Archbishop. Though the 
Pope was the only one who could elect them, the president could dismiss candidates for 
political motives, giving him an unprecedented power over the Catholic Hierarchy. 
                                                          
2 Domini salvam Fac Rempublicam: Domine Salvum Fac Praesiden eius et supremas eius auctoritates (Lord, 
save the Republic; Lord save the President and the Supreme Authorities) 
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Without Prelates able to contradict him, the factions of the Church that were against the 
measures of the State would be silenced and condemned to oblivion in poor parishes or 
in frontier territories.  
  This victory of traditionalism brought an immense power to the Church 
with the Concordat: a sacralization of political power in the form of ecclesiastical titles for 
the President (Abel 1984, 30), and gave the State a level of religious legitimacy that, 
combined with its control of education and registration, dissolved or radicalized 
opposition. The objective was to assure that the Liberals didn’t come back to power, but 
what it caused was a radicalization of both parties and the Church itself, creating a 
situation in which dialog was shunned as a possibility to reach consensus (Jaramillo 
Castillo 1991, 306).  
 
Economic Crisis, Religious Conflict and Political Upheaval. 
By 1887 Colombia was a country with an economy based on coffee exportations; after 
the crisis of quinine and tobacco, coffee had become the main exportation, reaching a 
staggering seventy percent of exportations in 1895 with Cundinamarca, Antioquia and 
Santander leading production (Bergquist 1973, 33). The entrance of international capital 
via coffee exportations helped the landholders and entrepreneurs acquire modern 
machinery, but made the conditions of workers worse: this “modernization without 
modernity” caused the already exploited Colombian farmers and laborers to depend 
even more on their employers, making this economic growth an exercise in inequality in 
regions like Cundinamarca and Tolima (Kalmanovitz 1989, 134, 144). 
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 This economic bonanza also brought consequences in politics: even if they were 
defeated, the Liberal elite had assets in coffee production. Their riches strengthened the 
party, and helped build the image of the hard-working coffee farmer that colonized the 
low lands, in contrast with the idle landholder of the highlands who depended on a static 
economy (Bergquist 1973, 98-99). The economic policies of the Regeneration favored 
the great producers with cheap credits, fiscal protection, and monetary centralization. 
However, these policies were also product of a weak state, that produced a crisis within 
the newly founded National Bank, an institution that ended up printing more paper 
money, instead of offering guarantees when the prices of coffee suddenly dropped in 
1896 (Kalmanovitz 1989, 145-146). 
 The dramatic drop in coffee prices worsened all the political tensions that had 
plagued Colombia since 1895. The economic policies of the State did not help the 
economy, nor strengthened the internal markets; instead, its centralization made 
corruption an everyday matter, as well as inefficiency regarding fiscal and monetary 
policies. Miguel Antonio Caro, then President, was not an expert in economy, and his 
perspective about policy and government caused the State to keep on with inflexible 
policies against free trade.  
 Rafael Núñez had died in 1894: though he had been re-elected for the 1892-1898 
period, it was his vice-president, Miguel Antonio Caro, who took over the Presidential 
Office (Martínez Carreño 1999, 27). Though both had helped in creating the 
Regeneration policies, Núñez considered them a codification of already existing 
practices, and therefore had a certain degree of flexibility regarding the legal framework 
built by the constitution. Caro looked at the Regeneration as the only chance to save 
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Colombia, an absolute good that had to be preserved against the “anarchy” of liberalism 
(Bergquist 1973, 56, 66-69).   
 The hard line of Caro strengthened the political subjugation already codified in 
the law 61 of 1888, making the situation between the National party and the Liberals less 
stable: political exclusion and repression of the press caused the Liberals in Santander 
to rebel in 1895 (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 21-22). This conflict was short, for the rebels 
had not prepared accordingly, losing in the Battle of Enciso in March after defeats in 
Tolima and Cauca; though the rebels had help from Venezuela, their lack of preparation 
and the strength of the national army were more than enough to defeat them (González 
2006, 66).  
Beyond the defeat of the Liberal rebels, this war also showed the deep divisions 
between and within the parties, along with the problems of the National Army and the 
extent of the armed peace of the Regeneration. The victory of the government, though 
certain, gave more power to the faction of the Liberal party that advocated for war. From 
their perspective, there was no point in negotiating with the government, and it was 
possible to destabilize the regime with a stronger rebellion. On the Conservative side, 
those that did not approve of the measures of the government started to call themselves 
the Historical Conservatives, and were seen as suspicious by the National Conservatives 
of the government, mostly because they did not reject the rebellion with the same zeal 
(Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 21-22).  
There was a degree of religious zeal in the position of the government against the 
compromise with Liberals. Liberalism under this regime was nothing short of a form of 
heresy, an opinion against the revealed truth of religion: it was impossible to be a good 
Catholic and a Liberal at the same time (Saldarriaga 2011, 20-22). Bishops like Ezequiel 
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Moreno y Díaz, from Pasto, and Pedro Schumacher, exiled Bishop from Ecuador, 
claimed that Liberalism was a sin and all those who followed it were imitators of Lucifer, 
who wanted to be free from the will of God (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 309). Both of these 
clergymen had problems with the conciliatory position of Monsignor Bernardo Herrera, 
Archbishop of Bogotá, whom Díaz considered guilty of the sin of negotiating with those 
who represented a fundamental moral mistake (González 2006, 72-73). As the country 
sank deeper into economic crisis, the consideration of this conciliatory perspectives 
became more common, as the elites looked for someone to blame for the disarray of the 
economy and the subsequent social turmoil it created. 
The position of the government was clear: Liberals were enemies of the public 
order. Meanwhile, the Church chastised them with the threat of eternal damnation: a 
radicalization made possible by the persecution the Church had lived in the period of 
radical Liberalism. For the Conservatives and the Church, the rebellion of 1895 was a 
confirmation that the Liberals were warmongers that wanted to wage war against the 
legitimate authority; for the Liberals, the repressive measures and the religious discourse 
against them were a confirmation of how their opponents were against any kind of 
freedom and progress. The conflict between them escalated with each movement, such 
as the political plans of Miguel Antonio Caro for the 1898 elections. 
Unable to participate once more in the presidential elections, Caro chose two 
candidates to represent him: Manuel Antonio Sanclemente and José Manuel Marroquín. 
This action caused the Conservative party to deepen the divide between the National 
and the Historical factions, just as the issue of war had divided the Liberal party 
(Martínez Carreño 1999, 30). In both cases, it was the most aggressive faction that one 
that prevailed: for the Nationalist conservatives, the support of the Church gave 
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legitimacy to their claims, strengthening political exclusion and giving the Liberals who 
wanted war to have a stronger voice.  
Another cause of division between Conservatives was the critiques of the 
Historical faction against the inefficiency of the central government regarding taxes and 
customs, the lack of planning of the infrastructure and monetary policy and the 
conscription policies of the National Army (Bergquist 1973, 102-104). These 
disagreements made them challenge the laws, annulling the repressive Law 61 of 1888 
in 1898, giving the Liberals who wanted peace a chance to keep their discourse of 
reformation as the most effective way to change the country.  
This chance however, was lost after the Conservatives won the elections of 1898: 
leaders like Rafael Uribe Uribe claimed that this victory was the ultimate abuse against 
those who did not live in capital. The division of Liberalism was not seen in terms of 
policy, like that of the Liberals, but in terms of sociology, with a young class of lawyers in 
the departments who wanted war, and a group of old merchants in Bogotá who wanted 
peace (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 24). The seeds of rebellion that had already been planted 
in 1895 started to grow, especially in the city of Bucaramanga, where the economic 
prices and the halt of public works had caused the bankruptcy of the coffee growers of 
the region, who depended on trade routes to Venezuela and the Magdalena river, closed 
due to the hiatus in infrastructure building and the chaotic administration of road tolls 
(Martínez Carreño 1999, 34-37). 
 In February 12, 1899, the direction of the pro-war faction of the Liberal party met 
in Bucaramanga around the local leader, Foción Soto, and signed a pact of going to war 
after gaining not just political leverage, but also the weapons they had hidden in secret 
caches after the rebellion of 1895. After discussing with the Liberal directory of Bogotá, 
39 
 
the Liberals in Santander declared war in October 1899: without enough weapons, 
recruits or international aid, the Liberals declared the most bloody and destructive wars 
of nineteenth-century Colombia: The War of the Thousand Days (Bergquist 1973, 171-
172, 239).  
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IV. THE WAR OF THE THOUSAND DAYS  
From October 1899 to November 1902, Colombia was engulfed in the most bloody and 
destructive of all the civil wars of the nineteenth century. This war caused the 
independence of Panama, and sparked the creation of a model of total war that went far 
and beyond the battles between the two main opponents (Calle Meza 2006, 26). The 
motivations of both factions in The War of the Thousand Days were layered with the 
narrative of wrongdoings of the opponent: the confiscations of the lands of the Church, 
the political exclusion of the Conservative Party during the federal republic, the exclusion 
of the Liberal Party during the Regeneration, and so on.  
Though both the Conservatives in the government and the Liberal rebels had 
armed forces under their command, the presence of guerrilla groups was one of the 
biggest differences between this war and the other conflicts of the nineteenth century. 
Before this war, armed conflict was a matter decided by men of the elite, a ‘War of 
Gentlemen’ in which the common folk had little to do with the results of war (Rubiano 
Muñoz 2011, 178-179). In the case of this conflict, the scale of the military actions taken, 
the economic relations between workers and landholders, and the economic exploitation 
of Liberal farmers caused farmers to flee to the mountains and form new armed groups 
that worked independently from the militias of the Liberal Party. 
The narratives of re-vindication were the ones that gave power to both factions, 
and mobilized the whole country to war. The economic crisis brought by the fall of the 
prices of coffee, along with the political exclusion of Liberals and the corruption of the 
government worked as catalysts for a conflict that had already begun in religious and 
political discourse. Both parties saw this conflict as a war of restauration: Liberals wanted 
to restore their political rights and the conservatives wanted to restore order (Rubiano 
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Muñoz 2011, 184). These beliefs in the righteous nature of their cause mixed with the 
lack of strategies and materials from both parties, with disastrous results for the whole 
country.  
   
Military actions of The War of the Thousand Days 
Like a forest fire, this war started in a specific point, and then it spilled out to the rest of 
the country: the region of Santander, located in the northeast of Colombia, had an 
economy that depended heavily on coffee trade through Venezuelan harbors (Martínez 
Carreño 1999, 34-37). The lack of proper roads and infrastructure and with the low 
quality of its product, worsened the economic crisis caused by the drop on coffee prices. 
The government printed more money without any sort of regulation, destabilizing the 
economy even more, changing the monetary patterns that had already existed and 
making the fiscal crisis even more hard to tackle (Correa 2009, 171). These economic 
issues emphasized the issue of political exclusion of Liberals, and fed the already 
existing complot of a Liberal rebellion, one which eventually began in October 17, 1899. 
 Following their experience in the rebellion of 1895, the Liberals from Santander 
had kept hidden caches of weapons, and gathered national and international contacts 
that could facilitate more arms and supplies. This network included the leaders of 
Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Ecuador: A Liberal coalition that promised to 
donate weapons, money and supplies for the rebel effort (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 279-
280). Besides these assets, the Liberals also had the veterans of the 1895 rebellion; and 
the leaders of the party who wanted war, such as Rafael Uribe Uribe and Benjamín 
Herrera.  
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 Unfortunately, they were not prepared; the weapons they had hid were piles of 
rusted metal, the international aid was long overdue, their militias had no training nor 
experience, and communications were almost impossible because the government 
owned the telegraphic lines (Martínez Carreño 1999, 46-48). The idea that the rebellion 
would strike swiftly vanished as soon as its problems became obvious. However, the 
rebels did not lose their impulse, and formed a new revolutionary government in 
Bucaramanga, propagating their ideals to other parts of the country, especially the 
northern coast, where Liberalism was strong. 
The first months of the conflict were disastrous for Liberals from a military point of 
view; though the Liberal militias seized Barranquilla, the government reconquered the 
city on October 25, 1899, after the battle of Los Obispos, a disastrous defeat marked by 
the tactical folly of Liberal fighters using lanterns in a nocturnal naval battle (Robles 
2015, 47-48). The Liberals also lost Bucaramanga, their capital city, on November 11, 
1899, once more because of lack of proper equipment, training, and military discipline 
(Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 244) in a battle where the bulk of their forces was made up of 
young students from Bogotá who came disobeying the instructions of the party elite 
(Bergquist 1973, 242).   On the other hand, the National Army, prepared with enough 
provisions and newly recruited conscripts from Boyacá and Antioquia, crushed the 
Liberals and inflicted them a series of defeats that restricted their actions to the territory 
of Santander. However, the Army did not take any decisive initiative to destroy the 
Liberal armies in the region, giving the Liberals a chance to regroup. 
Besides the problems with supplies and weapons, there was a deep divide among 
the Liberal generals; Herrera and Uribe Uribe had made clear that they hated each other 
(Bergquist 1973, 282). Given that neither of them wanted to compromise, they chose to 
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follow a more elderly commander, Gabriel Vargas Santos, who was a veteran of the 
wars of 1876 and 1895. Given that the Liberal party was already divided between those 
who wanted peace and those who wanted war, this problem did not improve their 
situation at all, breaking down an already uncoordinated war effort. The Liberal militia 
that formed in Santander had no communications with the guerrillas formed in other 
regions, such as Tolima, Huila or the Northern coast; the rebellion was breaking apart 
before its first victory. 
 When General Uribe Uribe failed to retake Bucaramanga after the victory of the 
government, he and his troops mobilized north, and in December 15 engaged in another 
battle in a bridge over the river Peralonso, in the northern part of Santander. The Liberal 
militias emerged victorious thanks to the inner conflicts between Conservative generals, 
and assured a path to Cúcuta, the biggest city near the border with Venezuela. Besides 
the tactical advantages earned by this victory, Peralonso represented a big morale boost 
for the Liberal fighters, and gave general Uribe Uribe a level of prestige that worsened 
the already tense situation between him and the other Liberal generals (Martínez 
Carreño 1999, 97-99). After Peralonso, most of the rebel militias stayed in Cúcuta, 
waiting for a weapons shipment that never arrived, losing precious time while their allies 
of the rest of the country resisted against levies, war taxes, and selective confiscations of 
the government (Calderón Molina 2000, 18).  
After a long delay, the Liberal militias gathered in the town of Rionegro, north of 
Bucaramanga: the plan was to keep going south, but near the city, they found the 
Conservative army, engaging in a battle that would change the course of the war. 
Between May 11 and May 25, both armed groups clashed in skirmishes in the plateau 
known as Palonegro, west of Bucaramanga. The Liberals, based in the town of Rionegro 
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and led by General Gabriel Vargas Santos had no clear plan, did not have the needed 
ammunition for their weapons, and not enough supplies, while their enemies, 
commanded by General Próspero Pinzón, had a strategy and enough supplies and 
weapons for the oncoming battle (Martínez Carreño 1999, 189).   
What happened in Palonegro can only be compared to the long battles of the 
First World War: victory was not a matter of strategy, but of arithmetic, turning Palonegro 
into a meat-grinder that overshadowed not just the other battles of the War of the 
Thousand Days, but all the civil wars prior to it (Guerrero Apráez 2013, 568). By May 15, 
the Liberal militias stopped receiving ammunition, and started using machetes; there 
were no doctors, and the water supplies of the field were polluted, causing an epidemic 
of dysentery and cholera in both the battlefield and in the nearby urban centers (Naranjo 
Villegas 2001, 30-33).  
The total amount of fighters fluctuated between 14,000 to 25,000 men on both 
sides, with approximately 1,500 to 4,000 dead and 5,000 wounded, mostly young 
farmers (Bergquist 1973, 298-299). Since there was no official census, nor were there 
doctors or bureaucrats in the aftermath of the battle, there is no certainty about the 
numbers related to the battle. However, it can be assured that an entire generation of 
working men died in this battle, just as a generation of students had died in the Battle of 
Bucaramanga before, crippling the economy of the region even after the survivors 
returned to their lands (Naranjo Villegas 2001, 34-35).  
The situation of the region would become worse when the National Army of 
General Pinzón seized the momentum and marched to Cúcuta, hoping to sever the main 
communication route between the Liberal militias and their allies from Venezuela. In a 
siege that lasted from June 11 to July 15 of 1900, most of the city was destroyed, and 
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the affluent foreign merchants left for Venezuela, leaving Cúcuta in both material and 
financial ruin (Martínez Carreño 1999, 200-201). The siege also sparked an international 
crisis, as the defenders were supported by Venezuela, not just with weapons and food, 
but also with troops (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 294-295). Amidst the general unrest of the 
country, the issue of these alliances being considered treason became a strong 
argument of the government against the Liberal rebels. 
 After severing the main Liberal forces and their allies, the National Army had a 
chance to win the war; but just as the Liberals were paralyzed by the crisis of leadership 
among them, the Conservative party was also deeply divided. By July 1900, a coup by 
vice president José Manuel Marroquín deposed president Miguel Antonio Sanclemente, 
widening the already existing gap between the Historical and the National factions of the 
Conservative Party, bringing a new edge on the debates about the war. Marroquín and 
the Historicals allied with the Liberals who wanted peace, promising them negotiation 
and political reform, but ended up giving the office of minister of defense to Aristides 
Fernández, the narrow-minded chief of police of Bogotá (Bergquist 1973, 304-305). 
Instead of pursuing negotiations, Marroquín and Fernández strengthened the laws 
against rebels, sentencing all men who fought against the State to death, either by firing 
squad or as conscripts for the National Army (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 359).  
The measures installed by Fernández had the objective to end the rebellion and 
to defend the true government and the true religion against those that wanted to destroy 
them. Such narrative was marked with the kind of intransigency instated by the Syllabus 
of errors, and used religion to justify his actions against the Liberals (Martínez Carreño 
1999, 141). This made the war go for a longer time, and confirmed the view of the 
Liberals of a tyrannical government that did not seek peace, but the eradication of its 
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enemies, causing them to go forth with the same mentality of obliteration, though with 
fragmented armed groups and without a clear strategy. 
The Liberal militia had lost its chance to walk into Bogotá as an organized group, 
moved to the Caribbean coast, taking Sincelejo and Toluviejo and tried to regroup in 
Magangué, a riverine town in the lowlands that worked as a strategic point between the 
coast and the inner Andean regions. Between September 21 and October 4, 1900, the 
remnants of the Liberal militias fought in a series of skirmishes against the National 
Army, but was defeated when the battleship ‘Colombia’ took over the river harbor with its 
superior armament that included heavy cannons and a machine-gun (Botero Palacio and 
Botero Campuzano 2005, 64-78). 
 What happened at Maguangué solidified the separation of the militias between 
those who traveled with Herrera to the Pacific coast and then to Panama, and those who 
went with Uribe Uribe to the Caribbean coast, leaving behind the Andean guerrilla 
groups on their own (Botero Palacio and Botero Campuzano 2005, 55).  These 326 
Liberal guerrillas fought mostly from Santander, Tolima and Cundinamarca, continuing 
the armed struggle in their regions without being recognized by the larger armed groups, 
much less integrated to their strategies (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 103). The decentralized 
struggle between the guerrillas and the National Army ravaged the country side and 
pushed the central administration into fiscal ruin: from 1900 to 1903, the struggle 
between these groups and the government became an essential part of the war. 
The guerrilla phase of the War of the Thousand Days cannot be understood as 
just one conflict between two factions, but as a war on many fronts that ended in a 
stalemate between a weak government and a myriad of armed groups that did not use 
the advantage they had to seize power (Martínez Carreño 1999, 123). This stalemate 
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was not something static, but a series of strikes that did not change the balance of the 
war and only worsened the brutality of all actors: each massacre only confirmed the 
fears of both the State and the rebels, and took away the control that the party elites 
once had (González 2006, 75). 
The government was aware of the chaotic situation, and in January 14, 1901 it 
proclaimed a decree that justified the prosecution of guerrillas as criminals, not as rebels. 
Guerrilla commanders who did not surrender in thirty days and continued to sustain their 
forces through forced loans and expropriations would be considered authors of robbery 
and leaders of criminal bands. All those who bought these goods, or gave donations 
would be considered accomplices, and would be confined in the prisons of Cartagena. 
These measures did not stop the guerrillas nor their supporters, and by February the 
government decreed that sentences for murder, theft, assault, property damage, and 
other crimes could be executed immediately without the need of a trial (Bergquist 1973, 
332-334).   
Instead of defusing the conflict, these acts of brutality made more people support 
the guerrillas, and by May 1901 these groups were at its peak; from there on the push 
from the government only caused them to dwindle (Robles 2015, 61). No matter how 
strong they got, guerrilla groups represented a clear threat to social order, and there was 
an implied agreement between party elites to disavow and persecute these groups as 
much as possible. However, given their knowledge of the terrain and their quantity, 
guerrillas could only be starved and persecuted instead of destroyed right away in 
military action (Calle Meza 2006, 132). 
Perhaps the only group that could break the brutal stalemate was the militia led 
by General Herrera, which did establish a foothold in the urban areas of the regions of its 
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influence: Cauca and Panama (Caballero 1982, 86). By January 1902 Herrera had 
secured territory in the south west of the country, and moved to Panama with enough 
personnel and supplies to carry on with a successful campaign in the isthmus: besides a 
disciplined army, he also had a division for intelligence gathering that gave him an edge 
over the Government forces in Colón and Panama City (Caballero 1982, 101-102).  
However, these military operations also threatened the interests of the United 
States, that had deployed its Marines to protect the railroad between Panama City and 
Colón, which ran parallel to the works of the Canal (Bergquist 1973, 368). Panama was 
the most isolated of all Colombian provinces, and it had gained international attention 
because of the construction of the canal sponsored by the United States. This territory 
had its own problems, which led to the creation of an indigenous guerrilla movement lead 
by Victoriano Lorenzo, whose motivations were less about party politics and more about 
the abuses perpetrated by white and mestizo leaders of the region (Jaramillo Castillo 
1991, 100). Though the situation in Panama was complex, its international importance 
didn’t allow this territory to fall into bankruptcy, unlike the rest of Colombia. 
The chaos provoked by the War of the Thousand Days only benefited the 
speculators, who negotiated lands and contracts with the State under great advantages; 
the country sank into an even worse economic crisis, caused this time by the lack of 
production and the financial disorder provoked by both inflation and speculation 
(Vanegas 2015, 163). Because of the war, the government approved a decree that 
allowed the National Bank to print as much money as necessary, and bring back the 
retired bills. This put 847 million pesos in circulation, causing massive inflation and a 
severe drop in the price of the Colombian Peso compared to the English Pound, the 
common international currency of the era (Correa 2009, 175).   
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These economic problems caused the government to consider the possibility of 
dialog and amnesty. By 1902, after years of chaos, the government stood between the 
intransigent position of Aristides Fernández and the slightly more flexible position of 
President Marroquín. On March, Fernández claimed that only repression could end the 
war (Martínez Carreño 1999, 210), but by June of the same year, President Marroquín 
presented a decree proclaiming an amnesty for all those who had rebelled against the 
state. However, this amnesty did not include those who had allied themselves with 
foreign countries battle Colombia, such as Rafael Uribe Uribe, Bejamín Herrera and the 
soldiers of the main Liberal militias (Rodriguez Gómez 2016) 
The actions of the National Army, the guerrillas and the militias became more and 
more desperate and atrocious as 1902 progressed. The much-needed peace was 
negotiated with the two main Liberal militias, with Uribe Uribe signing the treaty of 
Neerlandia in November 5, and Herrera signing the Treaty of Wisconsin in November 21 
(Bergquist 1973, 387-388). Neerlandia ended the war in the Caribbean coast, and 
Wisconsin, signed on the USS Wisconsin, property of the United States, ended the war 
in the territories of Panama, freeing the territory necessary for the construction of the 
canal.  
The situation with the guerrilla fighters, however, was much more complex: since 
the Liberal leaders had disapproved them, and there were so many, there was no way in 
which the government could conduct negotiations with all of them.  The rebels had no 
easy time returning to their lands: many died after having their passports, killed by 
government troops as traitors. Some only returned to see their lands deserted and their 
fortunes stolen by the government, having to move to another city; others had to pass 
days in jail because of local conservative officers who did not recognize the treaties 
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(Rodriguez Gómez 2016, 360-363). As the case of Victoriano Lorenzo shows, the war of 
guerrilla fighters did not end with the negotiations of Wisconsin or Neerlandia, but with 
the punishment the government reserved for bandits and common criminals: execution 
(Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 100). 
The war ended with approximately 80,000 military casualties in a country of four 
million people, either through combat or illnesses, with no statistics of refugees or civilian 
casualties (Martínez Carreño 1999, 211). Though it had won the war, the Conservative 
government fell from power in 1903, thanks to the efforts of general and then dictator 
Rafael Reyes: the victorious government had to face generalized ruin, massive debt, 
inflation and a lack of production that forced the country to import food or face starvation 
(Calle Meza 2006, 81). The loss of Panama in 1903 was an epilogue of the war, and 
though it was the most dramatic of the consequences of the war, it was not the worse of 
them all. 
The exclusion of many Colombians from their own nation was the most 
devastating and real consequence of the War of the Thousand Days. The allegiance to 
the nation was seen through the allegiance to a party, and so the belonging to the 
imaginary community of Colombia was exclusive for those who belonged to the same 
political faction. This identification with the party passed from father to son as a common 
identity marked by narratives of insults and revenges that had to be executed. This also 
strengthened the clientelist subordination of the low classes to the party elites, which 
caused more inequality and a delayed recognition of the needs of the many (González 
2006, 79-80).  
 Thirty years later, in a region where many veterans of the war had properties, 
Liberal politicians enacted their revenge against the conservative farmers and owners of 
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the land. What followed in that small region of northern Boyacá and eastern Santander 
was a series of massacres and uprisings that served as a prelude of La Violencia (1946-
1958) (Guerrero Barón 2007, 183). To understand this development, it is necessary to 
analyze not just what happened in the war, but who were the ones taking part in it. 
 
Social Elements of the War 
The War of the Thousand Days was the biggest of all the wars of nineteenth-century 
Colombia, not only in terms of human loss and economic setbacks, but also regarding 
the scope of military actions and the development of new war strategies. It was the last 
war of Colombia in which the rebel faction used militias instead of guerrilla groups, and 
the last war in which the partisan elites were involved as military commanders. It was 
also the first conflict that wanted to annihilate the enemy instead of just subjugating it 
(Calle Meza 2006, 68). All in a country amidst a terrible economic crisis and without 
either a comprehensive road or communications network. 
 Though there were two factions at war, three types of armed groups participated 
in the war: The National Army of the Conservative government; the Liberal militias; and 
the guerrilla groups. The first two can be considered ‘regular’ armies, since they had 
uniforms, a clear organization and fragile yet clear supply chains. They also had 
politicians and literate men among their ranks, making communication and gathering of 
information easier. Since the leaders of these two groups were part of the political elite, 
their justifications were based on ideals like the homeland, freedom, the republic, 
democracy and the rights of the citizens (Abel 1984, 2). The motivation of the soldiers 
also aligned with their party identity along with their personal interests, desire for wealth, 
and influences beyond their control (Tovar Pinzón 2001, 163).  
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Even with the ideological support given by the Conservative Party and the 
Catholic Church, the government was not able to form an Army of just volunteers: in fact, 
most government soldiers were conscripts, gathered from their hometowns without any 
warning (Bergquist 1973, 267). These men, aged 15 to 60, were forced to fight for the 
‘Church and the Legitimate government’ (Robles 2015, 74-75), were given little training 
or attention; some of them were Liberals who deserted to the guerrillas soon after their 
deployment, others were simply farmers who did not want to fight and some were 
Conservatives who volunteered for the Army. This combination of origins and motives 
worked against the morale of the military, a problem that was reinforced by the lack of 
education of the officers. 
Even though the National Army was supported by the policies of the 
Regeneration, most officers were selected not by their military expertise, but by their 
devotion to the party and its ideals  (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 35-36). These were men 
without formal education, but with experience in other civil wars like the rebellion of 1895: 
this was not a problem exclusive to the government, for this was the only kind of 
formation offered to Colombian militiamen of both parties. However, it is necessary to 
point out how economic crisis and the inefficiency of both Liberal and Conservative 
governments worked against the founding of a military academy in Colombia.  
In this context, Government Generals such as Isaías Luján, Manuel Casabianca, 
Vicente Villamizar, and Próspero Pinzón were not only non-professional officers; they 
also led an army composed of poorly equipped volunteers and conscripts. They 
compensated this with their own unity of purpose: even if the Conservatives were divided 
in the Historical and National factions, the generals rallied under the leadership of 
Casabianca as War Minister and Pinzón as General in chief of the Army in the first 
53 
 
period of the war, and under Aristides Fernández after the 1900 coup (González 2001, 
111). Though their political differences still existed, they were put aside to combat the 
rebellion; this unity of purpose gave the Army a tactical advantage over their divided 
enemies. 
The National Army had another advantage in its legitimacy as the agent of a 
government; thanks to this it could access supplies, information and weapons through 
regular channels. The government could negotiate with arms dealers upfront, and obtain 
international credits to pay for the weapons (for example, the shipment of 
decommissioned but functional Gras rifles bought to the government of France). These 
weapons were heavy and long, with accuracy mechanisms that needed basic arithmetic 
knowledge to be used, a dire problem in an army of mostly illiterate men (Jaramillo 
Castillo 1991, 203). However, the government also procured a steady supply of 
ammunition by using both international credits and by having its own network of roads 
across the mountains.  
It was this legitimacy of the government that benefitted the National Army: the 
use of telegraphs, for example, was a unique asset of the government, as was the 
access to money to pay for spies and messengers. It also allowed it to negotiate on the 
same ground with governments such as those of Venezuela, Ecuador, and most 
importantly, England, France, and the United States. 
If legitimacy was the strength of the National Army and the Conservative 
government, the lack of it was the biggest problem for the Liberal rebels. Though the 
Liberal militias were not part of any foreign nation, they had the support of the 
governments of Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua as part of a ‘Liberal International’ 
that sought to overthrow the Conservatives in Colombia. This support was supposed to 
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be an advantage, but became a problem when the government used it to undermine 
their cause, saying that this alliance was proof that the Liberals were traitors against the 
homeland and therefore could be sentenced to capital punishment (Deas 2001, 128-
130). 
Liberal armies depended on outside support to obtain food and weapons, as they 
had failed to secure their own hidden weapon caches from the last civil war. Farmers 
and landholders donated what they could to help these armies, but this only garnered the 
unwanted attention of the government, along with its war taxes and confiscations. 
However, since most of these men were volunteers, or at least men who followed their 
landlords and patrons to war, there were less problems of desertion and morale. But this 
proved useless against the lack of weapons, the limited supplies and the deep problems 
of the Liberal leadership. 
Unlike their counterparts, the Liberals could not mend the rifts between their 
factions: it was not only the division between those who wanted peace and those who 
wanted war, but also the differences between leaders and their followers. The greatest 
Liberal Commanders, Benjamín Herrera and Rafael Uribe Uribe, loathed each other and 
tried to undermine their successes, sabotaging any attempt to unite their forces. The 
leadership of Gabriel Vargas Santos, a man that had been fighting for the Liberal party 
since the war of 1860, was a smokescreen that covered the lack of communication 
between the generals; its lack of unity proved fatal in the battle of Palonegro.  
 During and after this battle, the Liberal faults became glaring mistakes. Barely 
having enough weapons, food or medicine, the Liberal militias did not have the chance to 
travel through the main roads of the Andean region. The little infrastructure that existed 
in Colombia was not available for the use of the Liberals, given their lack of numbers and 
55 
 
of personnel capable to use telegraphs, fix roads or manage spy networks (Martínez 
Carreño 1999, 117-118). However, their worst mistake was the choice of not using the 
guerrilla groups as military assets. 
Guerrilla groups, just like the Liberal militias, depended on the donations of local 
allies, but since their influence was mostly local, the quality and amount of supplies they 
could get was significantly lower. To compensate for this, guerrillas had to loot from the 
Army, from conservative farmers and from local landlords, squirming in the limit between 
political struggle and common banditry (Oviedo Arévalo 2013, 67-69). Guerrillas relied 
on women for medicine, food, laundry, espionage, and communications between 
different groups: ignored by the official stories of both parties, women were part of the 
war effort of all irregular armed groups regardless of their affiliation (Martínez Carreño 
1999, 108-115).  
Although they were afflicted by the same scarcity of weapons as the liberal 
militias, some guerrillas had access to the Austrian Mannlicher rifle, whose ammunition 
exploded after hitting the target with terrible physical and psychological effects on enemy 
groups. All guerrilla fighters had machetes, agricultural tools that were easily available 
and could be wielded effectively in the ambushes and night attacks, crucial for guerrilla 
warfare. Both the wounds of the Mannlicher and the tactics of the machete were 
exploited in terror tactics that crippled the capacity of the Army to act in regions like 
Santander and Tolima (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 205-206, 208-209).   
Some groups, especially those in Tolima, had their strategies based on the 
‘Código de Maceo’, a manual brought by General Avelino Rosas from Cuba, written by 
Antonio Maceo, a Cuban Independence fighter (Bergquist 1973, 339); the tactics of this 
code were based on ambushes, looting, and terror, and they worked to destabilize the 
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government, but they didn’t give any way to keep control over the territories controlled by 
the guerrillas. Urban centers like Ambalema, Buenaventura, Rioacha and Tumaco could 
be taken by the guerrillas, but the lack of discipline and supplies made these victories 
short lived enterprises amidst more pressing war operations (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 
47). 
This inability to keep and control urban centers points out the critical problem of 
all irregular armed groups: guerrillas suffered from both the lack of professional officers 
of the government and the broken leadership of the Liberal militias. There was an excess 
of untrained officers, and the ranks were confusing and led to tactical problems 
(Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 50-51). More than the weapons, supplies and tactics, it was the 
lack of clear organization, which led to the defeat and subsequent extermination of the 
guerrilla groups.  Heterogeneity proved to be their stronger point, but also the main 
reason of the groups’ demise.  
There were, however, Conservative guerrillas: irregular groups that acted like 
paramilitary cells alongside the National Army. The sources only point out at a very 
specific form of organization, one led by priests such as the ones of Father Ordóñez in 
Cachirí, Father Renderos of Boavita, Father Domínguez, of La Uvita, and Father Herrera 
of El Espino (Martínez Carreño 1999, 141). The existence of this groups points out to a 
topic that permeated the war and should be analyzed as its own element within this 
narrative: the role of religion in the War of the Thousand Days. 
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Religion in the War of the Thousand Days 
Within the complex and large context of the War of the Thousand Days, the actions of 
the Catholic Church and its members were anything but homogenous. Most laypeople in 
Colombia, no matter their political sentiments, were Catholics, and the immense power 
of the Church over the social fabric of the country made it a ubiquitous institution. 
However, this large scope of operations also pushed forth the possibility of many types 
of actions: geography, formation and personal goals interacted in a way that allowed 
priests to range from the most intransigent to the more reconciliatory types, a continuum 
that can be exemplified by bishops Ezequiel Moreno y Díaz and Bernardo Herrera 
Restrepo. 
 As the Bishop of Pasto, Moreno y Díaz governed one of the most traditional 
dioceses of the country, during his administration Pasto became a haven for priests that 
were against the Liberal government of Ecuadorian president Eloy Alfaro, such as Pedro 
Schumacher, Bishop of Portoviejo (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 308). In his writings, as well 
as his sermons, Moreno y Díaz equated Liberalism with Satanism, as Liberals were 
imitators of the rebel Lucifer: Catholics had to defend themselves against their attacks, 
as any sort of rebellion against the conservative government was also against Jesus 
Christ.  
 On the other hand, Bernardo Herrera Restrepo Archbishop of Bogotá had a more 
conciliatory position; though he cannot be considered a progressive priest, at least he did 
not exacerbate the violent situation of his time. He condemned rebellion under the terms 
of peace, and calmed the zeal of men such as Aristides Fernández and his allies in the 
College of San Bartolomé (González 2006, 72). By 1902 he called for a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, an enterprise that finished with the construction of the Basilica 
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of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, also known as ‘Basílica del Voto Nacional’, as a symbol of 
reconciliation of both parties and the consecration of the Nation to that holy icon (Cortés 
Guerrero 2001, 188). 
 Within the ideological continuum that had these men as the prime examples of its 
extremes, priests from all over the country acted in different ways, depending on the 
region they were from. Those from the regions where the War ravaged the land, such as 
Tolima, Boyacá and Santander, and those from traditional conservative regions like 
Nariño, were far more belligerent than those from the Caribbean or Bogotá. Some 
priests, as those described in the last section, took weapons and joined the government 
effort as paramilitary leaders; using the same rifles and machetes as the Liberal 
guerrillas (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 320-322). Though most of the clergy did not join this 
kind of military operation, their alliance with the Conservative party made them the 
perfect spokespeople of the government. 
 Though there is little to no information about the military actions of the priesthood, 
violence is explicit in the of discourse that the Church brought during the hostilities. 
Perhaps not all of it was as belligerent as the ideas of Ezequiel Moreno y Díaz, but there 
was little else that the Church could do during those dire times: the sermon had a 
prestige that could be hardly denied in those times, and it was used to call to arms, as 
José Calderón described to his descendants about the ‘special mass’ brought to his 
hometown of Pitalito in November 1899 (Calderón Molina 2000, 55-56).  
Though there is no other evidence of this, there is proof that the National Army 
had war chaplains who were treated as any other war prisoner by the Liberals (Martínez 
Carreño 1999, 142), and used prayers to Jesus or Mary before the battles, or even as 
battle signals (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 168). Religious discourse of the time not only 
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belonged to the priesthood, but also to the government officials, like Aristides Fernández 
or General Próspero Pinzón, who both claimed that they were defending the legitimate 
government, as well and religion, and their victories were caused by the protection of the 
Divine Providence (Bergquist 1973, 299;378). The devotion of Conservatives surpassed 
the official discourse of the Church, and it solidified the mixture of politics and religion 
that branded the Regeneration; the lines between political and religious discourse were 
blurred, and rebellion against the government became not just a matter of security and 
policy, but of religious morals. It is in this precise point in which politics, religion and war 
combined to create a model of conflict that transformed all wars from the Thousand Days 
onwards.  
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V. RELIGION, POLITICS AND WAR 
 
It is easy to understate the weight of Catholicism in nineteenth-century Colombia: priests 
were crucial social actors in the lives of citizens of all classes, registering their lives, 
administering their social welfare, and overseeing their education. For most rural 
Colombians, especially those from the Andean regions, the Church was the one of the 
few institutions with contact to the wider world, one that unlike the networks of 
commerce, was more open to those who were not wealthy (Abel 1984, 98-99).  
No matter their political allegiance, Colombians of the time were overwhelmingly 
Catholic; religious debate focused on how the Church should relate to the State and vice 
versa. What started as a debate on policy became tangled with religious discourse as 
the Conservative Party allied itself with the Church; when it came to power, both the 
Church and the State used one another for the consecution of their goals, a system 
called Regime of Christendom (Régimen de Cristiandad) (Cortés Guerrero 2001, 173; 
189). This regime had its roots in a version of Colombian national identity and, combined 
with deep inequality, created a cycle of conflict that solidified in the War of the Thousand 
Days.  
  
Catholic Identity and National Identity 
Considered to be one of the main points of contention that caused the War of the 
Thousand Days, the Constitution of 1886 was written as an expression of the realities of 
Colombian people, a “codification of the thoughts and desires of the nation”, as stated by 
then President Rafael Núñez (Bergquist 1973, 26). Catholicism, the religion brought by 
the Spanish Empire, was a pillar of social order and part of the national identity: to be 
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Colombian was to be Catholic and follow the spiritual authority of the Church, and vice 
versa.  
 This concept of Colombian identity legitimized both the power of the Conservative 
Party and the privileges of the Church; politics became ratified by religion, and religious 
discourse was amplified in politics. The Liberal party, traditional opponents of the 
Conservatives, were considered enemies of the Church thanks to their actions during the 
1863-1886 period, and therefore, their power was considered spiritually illegitimate. In 
the discourse of the Regeneration, socialists, liberals, atheists and freemasons were 
merged as one group that wanted to destroy the Church and the legitimate government: 
an enemy that was everywhere, and that needed to be defeated no matter the cost 
(Adarve Calle 2012, 152). 
 This reasoning falls flat because of its own implications: Regeneration politics 
claimed that Colombia was Catholic, while the Conservative party presented itself as the 
defender of the Church. Catholicism was equated to both Colombian and Conservative 
identities, but not all Colombians were Conservatives, and it is there where all problems 
began, because this logic made Liberals outsiders inside their own Nation and within 
their own Church.  
The story of José Calderón is a clear example of what could happen when this 
logic was used; as a Liberal and a Catholic, Calderón found himself alienated thanks to 
the discourse of the Church, and went off to fight in the Liberal guerrillas until the end of 
the War of the Thousand Days (Calderón Molina 2000, 58). The spreading of this logic 
across the Colombian territory can only be understood when matters of education and 
communication are considered. 
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 With a massive illiterate population, the kind of discourse that could prevail over 
this logic was circumscribed to the affluent classes of the larger cities. Besides, political 
discourse was limited to the traditional parties, not allowing any other option to 
participate in the debate; the press was limited by geography and resources. Church 
sermons, on the other hand, were everywhere, since the parish priests had a more 
constant way to communicate that did not need any kind of literacy to be understood 
(Fontecha 2009, 16).  
Though the Mass was in Latin, the sermons were in Spanish, making them an 
effective way to communicate and legitimize ideals under the banner or religion. 
Sermons against the Liberal party or supporting the Conservative party were an 
important part of the debate before and after the War of the Thousand days: if the 
citizens were Catholic, did this meant the Church could interfere in politics, telling the 
citizens whom should they support? Liberalism claimed that it should not have this 
amount of power, and limit itself to the sphere of private spirituality, while Conservatives 
considered that since the Church had the objective of leading people to their true 
happiness, they had the right to guide people regarding their political choices (Cortés 
Guerrero 2001, 180).  
 This complex debate was an integral part of a narrative of Colombian history 
where both parties had different versions of the actions of past governments.  The 
problem was that there was no system of acknowledgement of the faults committed to 
the other side, neither after the civil wars not after the periods of political upheaval. On a 
practical level, Colombian society had a system of ‘forgive and forget’ that tried to erase 
the memory of the problems instead of its causes (Rodriguez Gómez 2016, 324-325), a 
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system that did not impulse the political elites to seek a real solution to the problems that 
affected the country.  
What this empty forgiveness fostered was a need for retribution that made the 
debate over the scope of religious power within political discourse not a dialog over 
policy, but an argument where only the loudest voices prevailed. The fact that the War of 
the Thousand Days started as a reaction of a bellicose sector of Liberalism against the 
policies of a bellicose sector of Conservatism works as an example not only of this 
problem, but of how it perpetuated itself through time.  
This also points out to the solution to the problem of Colombian identity in the 
nineteenth century: the development of a binary system in which political identity was 
greater than national or religious identity. Only those of the same party could be 
considered good citizens, and only those aligned with Conservatism could be considered 
Catholics (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 375). This final equivalence of Catholicism and 
conservatism alienated Catholics that considered themselves Liberals and gave the 
Conservatives tools to legitimize violence under the guise of defense of moral and 
religion.  
Such false equivalency not only worked with laypeople, but served to strengthen 
the alliance between the Conservative party and a specific sector of the clergy that did 
not object to their actions. The priests in Panama and the Caribbean who solved 
problems with Liberal militias through dialogue, as well as those who protested the 
conscription of farmers by the government were ignored, and in some cases attacked, by 
the two belligerent parties (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 319-320). The image of the Church 
as united was not tarnished, and to keep it in its pristine state, the Ecclesiastical 
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hierarchy allowed the Conservative government to control it, an action that was censured 
when the Liberals had tried to do the same.  
The Concordat, a document approved by the Vatican that gave the Church many 
privileges, also allowed for the President to veto Bishop candidates, giving him and his 
party influence over the Colombian Church. As for the War of the Thousand Days, this 
mechanism benefitted the Conservative party and the most intransigent elements of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy. Other factions, such as the Liberal party and the progressive 
clergy, could do little: Liberals would not ally with the Church for that would break their 
principle of a secular society, and the Church did not want to dismantle its image of 
perfect unity by going against its allies. 
 In the long run both the State and the Church used each other for their own 
purposes, consolidating their power. This also meant they consolidated the social, 
economic and political inequalities that were the base of that power while muddling the 
boundaries between religion and politics. Just as in Colonial times, the power of God and 
the power of the State were intertwined. And just as in Colonial times, this helped to both 
compensate the mistakes of the State as well as keeping the social status quo. 
 
Politics as Religion 
Catholicism was ubiquitous in Colombia; everyday life was organized by the toll of the 
bells of local churches, where births, deaths and marriages were registered. Every 
neighborhood had a parish, and in territories that were not yet integrated into the nation, 
such as the Amazon basin and the Eastern Plains, the Church was the only institutional 
presence, instead of the State. Besides having a great amount of illiterate population, 
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Colombia was also a country isolated because of its geography and its lack of economic 
development; very few had the means to know what happened elsewhere, and those 
who did had to face another type of isolation. 
The elite classes of nineteenth-century Colombia did not know their own reality. 
The war and conflicts of the nation were seen as the same phenomena of other 
countries: the formation of the ‘Commune of Pasto’ by Bishop Manuel Canuto Restrepo y 
Villegas to counter the efforts of the Commune of Paris serves as an example of this kind 
of perspective (Ortiz Mesa 2011, 108). This also meant that wars were not made against 
exterior enemies, but against those inside the nation, and that the culture of Colombia 
did not receive major influences besides those that were already inside the territory. 
Isolation and the ubiquity of religion in everyday life created a special way to 
understand political conflict; political power was coopted by the educated elites, kept 
under a heavy blanket of ignorance and clientelism. Within this model, there was not a 
clear limit between religion and politics, and while political debate centered around the 
idea that religion became politicized, it was the other way around: in the nineteenth 
century, Colombian politics became like religion.  
What happened in Colombia during the nineteenth century is very different from 
other problematic situations that relate religion with conflict. Colombian conflicts were not 
religious per se, but their narrative cannot be understood without considering the 
religious themes that saturate them. These religious tropes worked as assumptions in 
the background of all conflicts: the original sins that cannot be forgotten, the war against 
evil, the evil nature of the enemy, and the search for salvation. What was in stake was 
not just policy or power, but the moral core of the nation. 
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This situation was not a theocracy, nor it was a complete takeover of religion or 
religious institutions by the State, but an alliance of like-minded factions to consolidate 
power. To have a better grasp of it, it is useful to use one of the few theories that relate 
politics and religion: the model of political religion stated by Italian scholar Emilio Gentile, 
that works as an explanation for the totalitarian regimes of the first part of the twentieth 
century.  
According to Gentile, totalitarian regimes bring what he calls ‘political religions’, 
since they depend on dogma, deification of a party, and the imposition of a cult of 
personality and social commandments (Gentile 2006, 12-13). Totalitarian regimes such 
as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union wanted to eradicate heterogeneity and replace it 
with political homogeneity of the governed, who should be morally united by their faith in 
the totalitarian religion. Myths centered on the birth of the nation, as the new regime sells 
itself as a glorious rebirth where every person can now transcend under the glory of their 
country.  
 Totalitarianism mimics religion, it syncretizes itself to religious traditions, or as in 
the case of the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain, it positions itself as part of a 
National Restoration effort. Religions of politics are invasive, although they bring 
meaning to the lives of those who are vulnerable after economic or political crisis. 
However, they are short lived, as either generational change or pressure from the 
exterior can make them crumble. Though useful to unite a country, especially one 
without strong institutions, political religions tear down the social fabric after they have 
been implemented, making them a short-term solution that creates long-term problems. 
 This system is useful to understand the kind of political fanaticism that possessed 
Europe after 1918, but its scope is limited if it used to understand nineteenth-century 
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Colombian politics, especially after the Regeneration. Even if it had Totalitarian 
tendencies and methods, Colombia had not fallen to dictatorial governments as other 
countries of Latin America: though the power was concentrated in a small segment of the 
population, there were elections, as well as a distinctive lack of militarism and 
nationalism.  
Though it pushed for a national Regeneration, the Colombian Conservatives 
lacked the desire to create a new type of person, yet shared the desire for homogeneity 
that Gentile attributes to political religion. His model cannot respond to this kind of 
situation where a still democratic government allies itself with a traditional religious 
institution, and both of them use the other to secure their power. Gentile can answer 
questions about Totalitarian States, but his theory is not enough to understand the 
formation of the "Authoritarian and modernizing State with a Constitutional facade" in 
Colombia (Calle Meza 2006, 43-44). 
There is no doubt that political power in Colombia was religiously sanctioned, to 
the point where Mass included a prayer for the Republic, the President and the 
Authorities. By allying itself with the Church, and by creating a system where the Church 
took over some duties of the State while being controlled by it, the Conservative party 
brought religion to politics, and in doing so transformed the political establishment along 
the lines of religion, a stronger cultural force than political debate. 
Within this system, political hierarchy was the basis of a clientelist system 
fostered by the constitution, in which the President and his party had the exclusive right 
to appoint governors and mayors across the entire country without counting with the 
people of the other party. Political parties were not structures of affiliates, but of clients 
that gave party membership and narrative, as an inheritance to their sons (Fontecha 
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2009, 10). To be part of the party was the only way to participate in the repartition of the 
State, and therefore, the only path to political and social significance (Guerrero Barón 
2007, 19).  
Just as the Church was the administrator of Sacred Truth, the political parties 
were the only administrators of power; no other association could have their share of 
power. The way in which political power worked was not through militarism, but through 
the rule of law, which in the practical sense meant the rule of Lawyers: a ‘Constitutional 
Messianism’ based in both the emphasis in the law inherited from the Spanish Empire 
and the continuous tradition of lawyers in power (Calle Meza 2006, 40) This allowed the 
status quo to continue through an antagonistic coalition, where the elite members of both 
the Liberal and the Conservative parties were against each other but indirectly cooperate 
by maintaining a state of war, where both could claim dividends (Munkler 2005, 114).  
With the concentration of political power, along with the issues of political identity 
discussed before and the ubiquitous presence of religion in Colombia, it is possible to 
understand the development of political belief as a crucial part of conflict. The ideals of 
both Liberalism and Conservatism were barely known, but the deep-seated faith in the 
part and its struggles was very real for those who fought in the civil wars. Both 
Conservatives and Liberals understood their struggle in terms of religion and morality 
instead of intellectual debate (Jaramillo Castillo 1991, 313-314).  
This created an atmosphere in which manifestations against Conservatism 
became manifestations against religion and therefore part of a dangerous problem that 
needed a violent solution (Guerrero Barón 2007, 23). This level of violence was 
answered with the same amount of force, destroying the relations between neighbors 
and regions. Only by understanding these issues of party politics as a matter of faith can 
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explain the testimony of Vicente Rangel after the slaughter at Palonegro: “It is enough to 
say that we fulfilled our duties on the battlefield with the passion, enthusiasm and 
determination accumulated in the 20 years, [we acted] as good Liberals. Nothing else” 
(Martínez Carreño 1999, 174). This faith on the values and the story of a political party, 
along with inequality and violence, created the foundation of a cycle of conflict that was 
perfected in the War of the Thousand Days. 
 
The Cycle of Conflict in Colombia 
There are six stages within the cycle of conflict in Colombia: the presence of political 
grudges, the crisis that makes violence erupt, the war itself, the period in which the war 
consumes the resources of the nation but not destroy it, the threat to the status quo and 
finally, the period of negotiations between the elite groups that foster new grudges 
amidst the population.  
The creation of grudges responded to the inherited stories of both sides. 
Conservative partisans learnt about the Confiscations of Mosquera and the policies of 
Radical Liberalism, while Liberals learnt about the Syllabus and the restrictive policies of 
the Regeneration. In the same fashion, these stories justified acts of vengeance as 
necessary actions that had to be enacted to avoid repeating the stories told. As 
explained before, this stage had everything to do with the construction of partisan identity 
in Colombia, and therefore answered to a logic of exclusion and violence. These grudges 
could keep quiet for a while, until a crisis in the country made people look for someone to 
blame: a scapegoat. 
The social mechanisms that act here can be understood under the memetic 
theory of René Girard: two people are close to each other, and desire the same things, 
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from this desire arises conflict, which is solved with the death of a scapegoat (Girard 
1986, 134). This model is unseen, yet woven into the social fabric of civilization, and it 
shines in moments of crisis, where social differences are weakened. It is crisis that 
brings forth the need for a scapegoat, for the narrative of desire, conflict, and death has 
already been established in the underlying narration of both myth and history (Girard 
1986, 14-15).  
In the specific case of Colombia, crisis could come in different forms, but just like 
violence, it was expected, thanks to a system of inequality and poverty. With an 
economy based on the exportation of commodities and a fragmented internal market, 
monetary crisis was inevitable. As for politics, the landscape or unsolved grudges and 
exclusion only needed an incident or a series of incidents to generate a political crisis. As 
there was no way in which common folk could participate in politics, violence became the 
most effective option for the disenfranchised to solve their issues, often against one 
another. Poverty and illiteracy made them powerless, so they would be easily 
manipulated or silenced according to the will of the main two parties. 
After the spurts of violence came the conflict itself. Colombian civil wars started 
as regional conflicts and then spread across other areas: the war of 1859-1862 started 
when Cauca, Santander, Magdalena and Bolívar rebelled against the Conservative 
government of president Pedro Nel Ospina (Cortés Guerrero 2016, 293); the war of 
1876-1877 started as a Conservative rebellion in Cauca and engulfed both this region 
and Antioquia (Guerrero Apráez 2013, 564). Ironically, this type of war could only be 
compared with those such as the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and the ‘New Wars’ in 
Africa and the Middle East, when economic inequality made possible the appropriation of 
the State by either one or two belligerent groups (Munkler 2005, 10).  
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Colombian conflicts came to the point where they could wreak havoc among the 
population, yet they never came to a point of no return regarding the destruction of the 
country. War was waged to get the main bounty, power over the State; and there was no 
point in earning decisive military victory if that meant this bounty would be useless. No 
party wanted to rule over a heap of ashes and rebuild a whole economy from nothing; 
instead they led each other to a state of economic exhaustion where only negotiation 
between the two warring parties could be held. Generally, only the governing party and 
its opponent would be part of the negotiations, but because of its scope in both military 
and territorial terms, the War of the Thousand Days introduced two new actors in the 
conflict, as well as another stage in the cycle of conflict: a threat to the status quo. 
Both guerrilla groups and international actors played a role in this war. The 
Liberal guerrillas were a dire sign for both parties, for their existence meant that their 
clientelist structures were compromised, giving different sectors of society voice through 
violence. Though their chance to triumph was uncertain, they were a clear and present 
danger to those in the government. Fortunately for them, the guerrillas were not able to 
secure a place of power, and were relegated to the place of bandits within the traditional 
narrative of the War of the Thousand Days, taking away their chance at political 
legitimacy by means of their illegal status. The other actors, namely the foreign 
governments that influenced the war, did not have the strength to invade and challenge 
the political status quo of Colombia. All except one: The United States of America, who 
had clear interests in Panama. 
The negotiations phase had to deal with these new elements, besides of the 
usual conciliation between the two political parties. As described in the last chapter, the 
negotiations with the guerrillas were minimal, for they were considered bandit groups, 
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barred from all political standing. As for the foreign governments, most of the possible 
international crisis were averted when the governments withdrew their aid to the Liberal 
rebels or, as Venezuela, had to face their own inner turmoil (Robles 2015, 77). The 
situation with the United States was dramatically different, and the negotiations in the 
USS Wisconsin were done out of fear for the consequences of an American invasion in 
Panama, a clear possibility given the presence of the USA Navy in the area (Cortés 
Guerrero 2016, 284). The Treaty of Wisconsin removed the risk, but the separation of 
Panama in 1903 cemented American power in the area. 
However, even with these new elements that challenged the status quo, the 
negotiations were still based on the principles of forgive and forget, with the added 
ingredient of ignoring the guerillas and their pleas. The executions of rebels were 
common, and point out at the incomplete nature of the negotiations: the war stopped, but 
the reasons that caused it were not addressed. The threat against the status quo was 
eliminated, but a new layer to the narrative of revenges was added to the first and last 
stage of the cycle: the presence of political grudges. Now combined with the knowledge 
of both the inner and outer threats to the status quo: the cycle changed in subsequent 
conflicts, but the basic structure that was laid down during the nineteenth century was 
perfected, via assimilation of new elements, in the War of the Thousand Days.  
And it is there, in the first and last stage of the cycle, as well as in the historical 
foundation of this cycle, that religion can be found. The narrative of grudges amidst two 
groups of basically the same population became irreversible in the moment in which 
debate started to be seen as an intrinsic problem of faith, rather than an intellectual 
challenge. The War of the Thousand Days changed the story of conflict in Colombia, but 
within the structure of conflict itself, it just represented a transformation from the wars 
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between armies to the conflicts among many armed factions. By assimilating the 
pressure of guerrillas and international actors, the cycle of conflict continued in the ways 
of narrative and identity, solidifying exclusion and creating scapegoats out of the victims 
of said exclusion. As La Violencia (1948-1958) would later show, this new development 
was more subtle and dangerous than ever before. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The War of the Thousand Days was not an isolated conflict, but one in a streak of many. 
Therefore, it cannot be understood completely in its own terms, but as a part of a longer, 
more complex process that entangled politics, war, and religion in a whole ethics of 
conflict, and a way to face and narrate the history of a whole nation. Besides these, there 
is another factor that, though overlooked for this thesis, permeates it all: oblivion, as in 
the opposing force of historical memory.  
There are no great monuments, nor history books nor a sense of belonging of the 
narrative of the War of the Thousand Days. Palonegro, the site of the most important and 
bloody battle of all the civil wars, is known not because its historical significance, but 
because of the airport built over the former battlefield. There, a lonely monument stands, 
conflicting with the sharp and modern lines of the terminal behind it. Though only an 
example, it points out two phenomena: the dissociation of Colombia with its own history 
and the obliviousness of the nation regarding its core components.  
The history of Colombia does not belong to the Colombian people: traditional 
historiography, taught in schools, is a long story of blood and boredom, of pictures of 
generals and their fights over the war spoils of governmental power. The stories of the 
forefathers and foremothers who went to war are seen as unimportant details of the 
larger narratives of great men. This chronic problem of oblivion guarantees that the cycle 
repeats itself, and it also makes crucial issues to melt in the background of everyday life, 
matters overlooked because of their omnipresence. 
Scholars of nineteenth-century Colombian history are as aware of religion as a 
fish is aware of water. The Concordat of 1887 between the State and the Catholic 
Church organized and ratified the already existing combination of religion and politics 
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into the fabric of everyday life. The Church kept the records of those who lived and those 
who died, made marriages official, oversaw public education, and was an integral part of 
both rural and urban life. Catholicism was omnipresent, and its influence was so strong 
that could be easily overlooked under the erroneous perception than religion was 
confined to the actions of the priesthood and the walls of the Churches.  
Another impression that this work had to struggle with was the idea of a 
monolithic Church, and the different ideas that circulated between the Church in Rome 
and the Church in the regions of Colombia. There are many questions left unanswered 
about the particularities of the Church and its members: The Concordat gave the 
President power to veto Bishop candidates, which created a situation where only 
Conservative Bishops could be appointed, eliminating the chance of a Church hierarchy 
that worked against the State and the elites that controlled it. Once more, obliviousness 
fueled a worldview that ignored the nuance of reality and produced a cycle of violence 
based on revenge, poverty, and inequality. 
The main purpose of this work and its formulation of a cycle of conflict sheds light 
into what has been thought as obvious. It also points out the necessity of new studies 
that focus more on the historical elements that are taken for granted, as well as a new 
perspective that seeks to formulate its own theories from the data, instead of making the 
data fit into a theoretical apparatus. The situation in Colombia is so complex and deep 
that it needs its own framework, one that can dispel the mists of oblivion from the mind of 
Colombian people, and make them the protagonists of their own history. 
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